Overcomplexity in a defense can be dangerous (see here). The Chicago Bears gave us another example, this time in the context of excessive pre-snap checks.
A national television audience witnessed the six passing touchdown first half by Aaron Rodgers. Perhaps the most notable of the six was Jordy Nelson’s 73 yard touchdown reception. The play was – as was obvious to the naked eye – a blown coverage. But why was the coverage blown?
Before the snap, Aaron Rodgers performs a hard count, attempting to draw the Bears into the neutral zone. As he does so, the Bears show blitz, with six defenders on or near the line of scrimmage, and a seventh (linebacker Lance Briggs) creeping in that direction. Safety Chris Conte follows a receiver in motion from left to right, showing (or at least feigning) man coverage.
After the hard count and the motion, Rodgers stops, turns to face his receivers to the right (in a trips formation), and signals while making a call. At the same, we see Briggs turning to motion and call to his fellow defenders.
Rodgers turns to the line as Briggs yells to his teammates
The defenders begin to move, as Briggs continues shouting orders and motioning.
Moments before the snap, we see Bears defenders backing away from the line of scrimmage. Conte backs up, showing (or feigning) zone.
The structure of the defense becomes clear as soon as the ball is snapped. There is one high safety, and cornerbacks in press. There are several options for what the Bears might be trying to play. The most likely are cover 3 or man free. In either of those options, the press cornerbacks would be covering any vertical pattern by the #1 receiver, who they are aligned over.
Cornerbacks in press, free safety deep in the middle of the field.
In the cover 3 or man free scenario, the answer to who blew the coverage is clear: the cornerback. There is no doubt that he played as if he had help over the top, forcing the receiver inside while jumping on a shallow route. This is classic cover 2 cornerback play.
The cornerback has forced Nelson to take an inside route, while eying a receiver who threatens the flat – classic cover 2 cornerback play.
Other (less likely) possibilities are (1) that Conte should have retreated in cover 2. This is not likely, because the free safety did not shade to the other half of the field. Alternatively, (2) the free safety may have been the guilty party, playing a version of cover 2 where he is over the top to Nelson’s side, while the opposite cornerback manned the other deep half, or (3) a version of cover 3 where the middle linebacker (who is dropping deep on the play) takes the deep third.
Nelson catches the ball. The free safety has not reacted from his deep middle zone, the cornerback trails from his cover 2 positioning, and the middle linebacker chases from his zone.
For the purposes of this post, knowing who was responsible for the coverage bust is immaterial. A particular player can be blamed, but the point is – as a coach – that someone did not get the message. “Not getting the message” is an inherent risk in playing such a cat and mouse game, and the Bears got burned.
The benefit that the Bears were striving for is clear. The opposing quarterback has just changed the play in order to beat our defense, so we will change our defense in order to frustrate his intentions. And there is no doubt that the caliber of quarterbacks in the NFL requires a defense to show different looks, lest a great quarterback such as Rodgers pick them apart. On paper, it makes sense to attempt to frustrate Rodgers in this fashion, especially towards the end of the play clock, when Rodgers cannot audible again. But the game is played on a noisy field in front of thousands of fans, where communication is difficult, and the draining play clock also means that the Bears have little time to make their adjustments. Players need to call and receive the new front/blitz/coverage, adjust their alignments, and mentally digest the information – all in the final few seconds before the snap. It can – and does, on many occasions – work. But when it doesn’t work – as is often the case – it can lead to catastrophe for a defense. The defensive coordinator must always consider this balancing, essentially asking himself “Is the benefit of confusing the offense worth the risk of confusing ourselves?” There is a fine line between creating confusion for the opposition and creating confusion for yourself, and in this case, the Bears beat themselves before the ball was put into play.