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Jan 032015
 

The Dallas Cowboys run game has vaulted them into the playoffs, providing a strong offensive identity for a team that has struggled to break into the elite ranks of the NFL. This run game is nothing revolutionary; to the contrary, it is a simple, zone based scheme. NFL fans often view the word “simple” as an insult – with the apparent conventional thinking being that an offense must be complex and a coach must vary his schemes every week in order to confound defenses. While there is truth to the notion that game planning and varied schematics are essential in the NFL, the 2014 Cowboys achieved success by investing in their offensive line and getting great at their base schemes, and using those base schemes over and over again to open large holes for DeMarco Murray, who led the NFL in rushing by almost 500 yards.

The first thing to note is that – as mentioned above – the Cowboys have invested heavily in their offensive line with high draft picks, and it has paid off. Their line as a unit is agile, smart, and does a great job of sustaining blocks. The second thing to note, however, is that they do not – as a general rule – blow the opposition off the ball. Covering up the defense – aka getting bodies on bodies and taking defenders where the defenders want to go – is more important to their success than is drive blocking those defenders down the field. As illustrated below in their week 14 game against the Chicago Bears, in which Murray ran for his season high of 179 yards, the Cowboys’ offensive linemen took great angles, prevented penetration, were patient with their blocks, and therefore opened numerous creases for Murray and the Cowboys to exploit. It wasn’t rocket science; it was great, sustainable execution.

As Murray receives the inside zone hand off, his line covers up the Chicago defensive line

As Murray receives the inside zone handoff, his line covers up the Chicago defensive line

The Bears haven't been blown off the ball, but a wide running lane opens up as Cowboys blockers stay engaged to defenders.  Murray goes for 8 yards on the play.

The Bears haven’t been blown off the ball, but a wide running lane opens as Cowboys blockers stay engaged to defenders. Murray goes for 8 yards on the play.

Joseph Randle takes the outside zone handoff.  The angles are flatter on the outside zone, but the result is the same: Cowboys blockers engaged with Bears defenders.

Joseph Randle takes the outside zone handoff. The angles are flatter on the outside zone, but the result is the same: Cowboys blockers engaged with Bears defenders.

Once again, a crease develops as Cowboys offensive linemen stay engaged on their blocks, and Randle exploits it for a 17 yard touchdown run.

Once again, a crease develops as Cowboys offensive linemen stay engaged on their blocks, and Randle exploits it for a 17 yard touchdown run.

One of the best plays in the Cowboys run game has been their counter, which has become an essential (and prolific) compliment to their zone game.  Their counter resembles a classic pin and pull scheme, with both guards pulling as the remaining blockers pin down the defenders shaded to the right.  Murray and Tony Romo simulate their initial footwork of the Cowboy zone package to set up the counter.

One of the best plays in the Cowboys run game has been their counter, which has become an essential (and prolific) compliment to their zone game. Their counter resembles a classic pin and pull scheme, with both guards pulling to the left as the remaining blockers pin down the defenders to the right. Murray and Tony Romo simulate their initial footwork of the Cowboy zone package to set up the counter.

Pulling guard Ronald Leary's crushing block highlights another Cowboys victory at the point of attack. Solid offensive line execution and linebacker over-pursuit opens a massive cutback lane, which Murray exploits for a 40 yard gain.

Pulling guard Ronald Leary’s crushing block highlights another Cowboys victory at the point of attack. Solid offensive line execution and linebacker over-pursuit opens a massive cutback lane, which Murray exploits for a 40 yard gain.

Another look at the Cowboys inside zone.  A strong run game is often most damaging late in the game, and there is no exception here.  Again, the Cowboys cover up the Bears front as Murray receives the ball.

Another look at the Cowboys inside zone. A strong run game is often most damaging late in the game, and there is no exception on this play. Again, the Cowboys cover up the Bears front as Murray receives the handoff.

Murray prods the hole with patience, and then explodes through another crease forged by his athletic offensive line for a 26 yard gain.

Murray prods the hole with patience, and then explodes through another crease forged by his athletic offensive line for a 26 yard gain.

A great, physical run game does not have to mean blowing the defense off the ball. Intelligence does not have to mean complexity. The Cowboys have based their offensive attack on a few plays that they execute well, once again proving that – even at the highest level of the sport – execution is the most important factor in achieving success. Obviously, they are not as simple as a Pop Warner team. They use a variety of formations and motions and shifts as well as their complimentary passing game to aid in running the ball. But, at their core, they share an important similarity with many lower level powerhouses: they are great at a few things, and everything else builds form there.

Aug 062014
 

Play calling is not only one of the most difficult tasks in coaching, but also what coaches are most often criticized for. While it may seem easy to those watching at home, the multiple stresses present when calling a game in the heat of the moment make it easy for a coach to make decisions that he will question in hindsight.

The best way to increase the likelihood of calling a good game is – obviously – to have a plan.

The most publicized methods for play calling come from the college and pro ranks. Television cameras usually show a head coach or offensive coordinator with a large, laminated printout, with hundreds of plays on front and back, highlighted and sorted for every situation that the coach can foresee. There is often a script, which is a set list of plays to start the game. And then there are lists of plays for first and 10, second and 10, third and ten, second and medium, second and short, third and medium, third and short, third and long, goal line, two minute, trick plays, etc etc etc.

This is a sound approach. It allows a coach to quickly access plays that he has pre-selected for certain situations. By pre-selecting the plays, he has already thought through what he thinks will work. He will not be frazzled when he faces a 4th and 15 with the game on the line – he has selected the best plays for that situation when he had a clear head, before the game.

But there are other methods that can be just as – if not more – successful. One such method is “if/then playcalling.” In short, if/then playcalling says: “if the defense does this, then we will do this.” This is a great way for a coach to organize his thoughts, as it gives him a set response to whatever adjustments the defense makes.

This is most effective when running a true “system” offense. One of the best articles on the subject details flexbone master Paul Johnson’s if/then methodology: http://footballislifeblog.blogspot.dk/2011/07/paul-johnsons-if-then-methodology-to.html

When running a “system” such as the flexbone, it is often hard to prepare to face a particular defense, because opponents will often create a special defense specifically to face that system, unrelated to their base defense. Determining your if/then methodology makes sure that you will have an answer for whatever the defense throws at you.

This is also beneficial in playbook creation. If, for example, you are a triple option team, but you have no response for heavy blitzing and stunting in the middle of your line that disrupts your timing and mesh points, the defense will seize on that weakness. By creating an if/then methodology for yourself, you force yourself to think like a defensive coach to come up with every possible scheme to stop your offense. Then you must make sure that you have a response for all scenarios. Doing so – much like studying for an exam by taking practice tests – creates an active learning environment, which will lead to greater understanding and mastery of one’s own offensive system.

The if/then methodology and similar methods of planning work in a variety of offensive systems. The if/then methodology is closely related to the “Wing T order of football,” (The Delaware Wing-T: An Order of Football
) in which a Wing T master knows exactly how to place various defenders in conflict, and how to take advantage of whatever actions the defense takes. Likewise, Mike Leach of Air Raid fame is known for keeping his plays on a small sheet of paper, and using a pen to mark what plays work and what plays don’t work. His goal is to take what the defense gives him – and make note of it – which is another variation of an if/then methodology.

System football – and offensive football in general – is all about taking advantage of the structural weaknesses in a defense. Incorporating an if/then methodology into your play calling will force you to consider how you believe you can best dissect a defense, which is the core of any “system” offense. Even if you find that if/then play calling is not for you during the game, thinking in terms of how to respond (and making sure you have a response) to any defense will help any offense.

Jul 042014
 

The counter sweep is not a common play, but for decades the Nebraska Cornhuskers used it as a primary weapon to power their prolific run game.

The counter sweep is closely related to the counter trey, which became – and remains – a staple in the run game. The blocking schemes look identical at the start of the play, but differ at one key point.

In the counter trey, the pulling guard attempts to kick out the defensive end. The tackle (or sometimes a back) cuts inside of this block to lead the play.

In the counter sweep, the pulling guard “log” blocks the defensive end. This means that – rather than kick the end out – the guard attempts to pin him to the inside. The tackle’s path is deeper in the backfield than on the counter trey, and he goes outside of the guard’s block, looking to lead the play wide and down the field.

The counter trey is a power, off tackle run. The counter action by the backfield seeks to draw the defense in the wrong direction for a split second, which is then exploited by power and numbers at the point of attack.

The counter sweep also attempts to influence the defense to the wrong side of the field, but the play seeks to get the ball carrier as far as possible from the interior of the line.

This resulted in consistent big plays for Nebraska. Of course, Nebraska was also one of the most physical teams in the country, often employing the best offensive lines and the most talented backs. The defense needed to react hard to the play side, and Nebraska exploited that fact by caving in the other side of the line with power, and leading the play with swift, disciplined pulling linemen who were followed by backs who could outrun everyone to the sideline.

While most teams won’t enjoy such advantages, it is surprising that the counter sweep is not employed more often, if nothing more than as a compliment to the counter trey. The two plays go hand in hand. Not surprisingly, Nebraska used a play they called “counter trap” to compliment the counter sweep. Their counter trap featured the guard kicking out the end, and the guard cutting inside of his block – just like the counter trey.

The counter sweep adjustment – at the least – should be installed, to account for a block down step down defensive end. Such an end can be almost impossible to uproot with a kick out block, but is very easy to log block. The tackle and ball carrier should be able to read this block and run to the outside, thus – in effect – executing the famous Nebraska counter sweep.

For video of the Nebraska counter sweep:

For more analysis and video (including the Nebraska counter trap), visit trojanfootballanalysis.com:

http://trojanfootballanalysis.com/?p=55

Jun 192014
 

The trend towards pass first offensive football has generally led to a decrease in run game intricacy. Spread and pass first teams have found that they can put up high point totals with only a few simple run blocking schemes. This approach is sound – with focus on the passing game, the simplified run game means that high levels of execution can be attained on the few blocking schemes that are in the playbook.

This does mean that some concepts of the past have been largely lost. The following play exemplifies the lost art of the complex run game, a tackle trap on a top nose guard (Tony Casillas), intended to make that nose guard’s life difficult while opening a sizeable hole and utilizing angles across the line of scrimmage.

The blocking scheme: Right tackle blocks down on star MLB Brian Bosworth.  Right guard pulls and looks for work. Center posts on star nose guard Tony Casillas, then walls off the defensive tackle.  Left guard goes for the other MLB.  The left tackle pulls and traps Casillas, while the fullback walls the other defensive tackle to the outside.

The blocking scheme: TE walls off the outside.  Right tackle blocks down on star MLB Brian Bosworth. Right guard pulls and looks for work downfield. Center posts on star nose guard Tony Casillas, then walls off the defensive tackle. Left guard goes for the other MLB. The left tackle pulls and traps Casillas, while the fullback walls the other defensive tackle to the outside.

The blocks take advantage of angles, including the smashing trap on Casillas.

The blocks take advantage of angles, including the smashing trap on Casillas.

Casillas is sent to the turf as running back Jacque Robinson (father of NBA star Nate) exploits a wide running lane.

Casillas is sent to the turf as running back Jacque Robinson (father of NBA star Nate) exploits a wide running lane.

Robinson is untouched into the defensive backfield.

Robinson is untouched into the defensive backfield.

Robinson finally faces impact at the goalline.

Robinson finally faces impact at the goalline.

Often, the best offensive system is the one that goes against contemporary trends. Increasingly, teams are finding that the spread offense is not a magic bullet. While the many variations of the spread ARE sound football, defenses are now built to stop them, and those offenses lack the novelty that once made them so difficult to defend.

Perhaps those defenses – built to stop the spread passing game and various zone running schemes – are now susceptible to a return to power running. The Stanford Cardinal under Jim Harbaugh and David Shaw, as well as the San Francisco 49ers under Harbaugh, have capitalized by building swift, powerful lines and incorporating complex run schemes and jumbo personnel packages. Once a staple, those schemes are now the novelty while the spread offense thrives. While mastering the execution of a run game complete with powers and counters and traps and whams and isolations can be difficult, it is more than possible with proper commitment.

The play:

May 172014
 

“Read option” is one of the most overused terms in football. From commentators to sideline reporters to sportswriters, a myriad of plays are lumped together and mislabeled “read option.”

In reality, every option is a “read” option. The quarterback always reads an unblocked defender or defenders to determine whether to give the ball, keep it, or pitch it.

Still, the “read option” has become synonymous with shotgun, spread option football. The play that epitomized the spread option running game is what most coaches call the “zone read.” The key feature of this play is that the offensive line zone blocks for a run to the right or left, while the quarterback reads a defender to the backside. If that defender over pursues the zone handoff to the running back, the quarterback keeps the ball to the space that he vacated.

5 Eagles offensive linemen for 5 Giants defenders; the 6th defender (in the yellow box) becomes the option key.

5 Eagles offensive linemen for 5 Giants defenders; the 6th defender (in the yellow box) becomes the option key.

In short, in the zone read, the quarterback and running back are going in opposite directions from one another.

The quarterback and running back aim in opposite directions

The quarterback and running back aim in opposite directions

The zone read – for whatever reason – became known as the “read option.” This was a fine development, until it began to be applied to every option play from the shotgun or pistol formation.

The option key tackles the running back, so the quarterback keeps to the vacated space

The option key tackles the running back, so the quarterback keeps to the vacated space

The option key tackles the running back; the quarterback has correctly kept the ball.

The option key tackles the running back; the quarterback has correctly kept the ball.

Easy yards for the quarterback

Easy yards for the quarterback on the zone read (“read option”)

The most glaring example of this phenomenon was during the “read option” explosion in the NFL in 2012, when both the 49ers and Redskins had great success with the “read option” from the Pistol formation. The only problem is that the vast majority of their success was not from the “read option,” but from the veer scheme.

In the veer scheme, the option/dive key is the first man on or outside the offensive tackle

In the veer scheme, the option/dive key is the first man on or outside the offensive tackle

The key difference between the veer and the zone read is that in the veer scheme, the dive back and the quarterback are both attacking the same side of the field. In the traditional veer scheme, the offensive line does not block the first man on or outside the play side tackle. This becomes the option key. The dive back aims – at full speed – between the guard and the tackle. If the option key can’t make the tackle, the quarterback hands off, and the running back runs underneath the option key, following extra blocks on the second level and third level (because the tackle and tight end – if there is one – do not block anyone on the line of scrimmage, which frees them to block downfield). If the option key can tackle the dive back, he can’t tackle the quarterback. The quarterback keeps the ball, and follows the same extra downfield blocking (note that in a true veer triple option – which the 49ers and Redskins rarely ran – the quarterback would have a second option key and the option to pitch to a pitch back depending on that option key’s movements).

 

The quarterback and running back attack the same side of the field in the veer scheme.  Here, the option key is too far up the field, so the ball is given to the dive back

The quarterback and running back attack the same side of the field in the veer scheme. Here, the option key is too far up the field, so the ball is given to the dive back

Thus, in the “read option” the quarterback and the running back go in opposite directions, while in the veer scheme they attack the same side of the field and follow the same blocking.

 

The offensive line walls off the middle of the field, and the dive back follows behind, while the option key cannot recover

The offensive line walls off the middle of the field, and the dive back follows behind, while the option key cannot recover

The dive back glides along the veer wall to the end zone

The dive back glides along the veer wall to the end zone

Less common in the NFL, but still mislabeled, is the midline option. The play is similar to the veer scheme, except that the option key is the first man on or outside the play side guard, and the dive back’s path is over center or just to the play side (depending on the coach). Again, this varies from the “read option” in that the dive back and the quarterback both run to the same side of the field.

Apr 292014
 

In part one, we discussed the advantages of playing with a cheap quarterback, and asked whether an NFL team would ever consider implementing a system designed to minimize reliance on a traditional “pro style” quarterback.  This would allow such a team to refuse to pay a quarterback over a certain cap figure, therefore gaining an advantage in their ability to strengthen the remainder of their roster under the salary cap.

Please note that this isn’t to say that paying a franchise NFL quarterback is a bad idea.  If the quarterback is a star, it is of course smart to pay that quarterback, and players like Peyton Manning, Tom Brady, Drew Brees, and Aaron Rodgers have proven their ability to put their team on their shoulders as consistent championship contenders.  This article is a hypothetical for those teams who never seem to stumble upon the star quarterback, and who therefore remain stagnant in mediocrity year after year.

The rarest commodity in football is the great drop back pocket quarterback.  It has proven nearly impossible to predict which quarterbacks will succeed in the NFL, because so many of the skills are intangible and hard to measure against college competition.  That is why the list of number one overall picks includes the likes of JaMarcus Russell, David Carr, and Tim Couch.  The list of top NFL quarterbacks currently in the league is a mix of number one overall picks like Peyton Manning and Andrew Luck with overlooked prospects like Tom Brady (a “fringe” NFL prospect selected in the 6th round), Aaron Rodgers (too slight and with too much attitude to be taken with the first pick) and Drew Brees (too short to be a first round prospect).

The specific quarterback skills that have proven almost impossible to predict are: the ability to make complex progression reads against complex, fast NFL defenses; the ability to deliver the ball from the pocket against pressure from an NFL pass rush; and the ability to deliver the ball with accuracy and proper timing despite the above mentioned factors.  While arm strength and accuracy (now referred to as “arm talent”), leadership, intelligence, and positive demeanor all play a role in predicting the success of a pro style quarterback, none of them have been able to predict whether the player would possess or have the ability to develop the intangible skills that make a successful pro style quarterback.  Plenty of smart, hard working, positive leaders with great arms have failed in the NFL because those skills are so rare and hard to develop.

An “interchangeable quarterback offense” would seek to minimize the reliance on such skills, and would emphasize easier to predict qualities, such as arm talent, running ability, leadership and intelligence.

The following offensive systems and coaches are candidates to run such a system.  Please note that inclusion on the list does not mean that a quarterback who plays in such an offense is not or cannot become a good pro style quarterback in a traditional offense.  It is only to say that the offense does not require a traditional pro style quarterback to be successful.

(1) Chip Kelly.  Kelly has already proved this possible in the NFL, shifting between Michael Vick and Nick Foles with great success.  His offense spreads the field to create easy pre snap reads for the quarterback and offensive line.  The offense is built on the run game, as the spread formation forces the defense to defend the width of the field, making it easier for the offensive line to count and block the box (see here).  It can accommodate fast quarterbacks like Vick who can take advantage of over pursuit against the zone run game by keeping the ball (the “read option”), or it can accommodate more stationary quarterbacks like Foles by creating easy reads, quick throws, and taking advantage of packaged plays in order to hold backside defenders.  Kelly’s tempo allows the quarterback to get into a rhythm without over thinking the offense, while also limiting the defense’s ability to call complex schemes.  Because the offense is built on the run game, a top offensive line and above average running backs are a necessity, while favorable coverages mean that the offense can succeed without premier pass catchers (Kelly’s confidence in the latter is evident in the Eagles’ release of DeSean Jackson).  Money can be spent on the offensive line and defense.

(2) Gus Malzahn.  Malzahn is perhaps the most intriguing coach on the list.  His offense is also a hurry up spread offense, but is schematically dissimilar to Kelly’s attack.  Malzahn’s offense is based on the Delaware wing t, one of the most potent running offenses in the history of football.  Unlike Kelly’s zone scheme, the wing t takes advantage of angle blocks and a variety of pulls and traps.  The offense is built on an order of play calling to systematically attack any defense.  The up tempo pace simplifies this process (especially with a master such as Malzahn at the helm), as the defense’s ability to substitute and vary schemes is limited. This order of attack of the traditional wing t is combined with elements of modern spread option and spread passing games to create a potent attack that takes advantage of a great athlete at quarterback.  Like Kelly’s offense, the potency of the run game and the spread formations create easy reads and progressions in the pass game, making the offense ideal to plug and play non traditional quarterbacks.  This is why Malzahn has thrived with a variety of athletes at quarterback, from prototypically built #1 overall pick Cam Newton, to the smaller, quicker Nick Marshall, who began his career as a cornerback at Georgia, to less physically imposing Paul Smith at Tulsa, who threw for over 5,000 yards in his season with Malzahn, proving the versatility of the system.  In fact, Malzahn had a streak of needing to find a new starting quarterback for 8 straight seasons (see here), his system flexible enough to adjust year in and year out.  Should he choose to move to the NFL, Malzahn would have his pick of under the radar quarterbacks to run his potent system.

(3) The pistol offense.  The pistol offense makes a quarterback’s job easier in several ways.  The run game is powerful and downhill.  The veer scheme requires a quarterback with top flight speed (such as Robert Griffin III and Colin Kaepernick) because the mesh point happens deeper in the backfield, but with that speed, the defense is forced to decide between playing aggressive against the option elements (potentially leading to over aggressiveness that the veer scheme can exploit, and easy reads for the quarterback in the pass game) or playing a more passive defense that is susceptible to the power elements of the scheme.  The pistol also takes the quarterback out from under center, giving him increased vision in the pass game.  The offense has already thrived with the Redskins and 49ers, though neither has used it exclusively.  While Chris Ault is retired and unlikely to get an NFL look, the offense is popular enough for other coaches to implement the scheme.  The most likely scenario is for it to continue to be used within “typical” NFL offenses, as a weapon to take advantage of a quarterback with the speed of Griffin III or Kaepernick.

(4) Jim Harbaugh power offense.  Jim Harbaugh makes the list because he is confident enough in his system and his ability as a quarterbacks coach to believe he can make a wide range of quarterbacks successful.  He has already proven adept, resurrecting Alex Smith’s career, and turning raw Colin Kaepernick into one of the league’s premier playmakers.  His system is built on a powerful and complex run game, unbalanced lines, pre snap shifts, and versatile personnel.  Defensive coordinators know that Harbaugh is looking to assert his will with his complex run game.  The potent run and play action games in turn create easier reads for the quarterbacks.  Unlike the spread and many NFL offenses, Harbaugh often keeps extra blockers in the backfield, giving his quarterback simpler 4 or 3 or even 2 receiver reads.

Harbaugh’s offense is complex, however, requiring quarterbacks to choose between multiple plays at the line of scrimmage on most snaps depending on the defense.  But those decisions are a matter of intelligence, not instinct, and intelligence is more easily measured than intangible NFL quarterback skills.  This is why Harbaugh has been successful with Alex Smith and Colin Kaepernick, both of whom have size, speed, arm strength and intelligence, but whose NFL drop back quarterback skills were questioned before Harbaugh became their coach.

Harbaugh and the 49ers will soon show their intentions.  Should they pay Colin Kaepernick like a top NFL quarterback, they take the course of the typical NFL franchise.  Should they attempt to low ball Kaepernick in negotiations, it will be a sign of their confidence in Harbaugh’s quarterback development abilities.  Don’t be surprised if the 49ers pick another raw, athletic, developmental quarterback with great arm strength in the upcoming draft, such as Virginia Tech’s Logan Thomas.

(5) The Air Raid crew.  The coaching tree that Hal Mumme started (including Mike Leach, Kevin Sumlin, Art Broyles, Dana Holgorsen, and Tony Franklin)  continues to tear up the college ranks.  Rooted in LaVell Edwards’s BYU passing offense, hallmarks of the Air Raid are simplicity, tempo, and a willingness to throw the ball all of the time (in the original Air Raid offense).  These factors – like Kelly’s and Malzahn’s offenses – simplify quarterback reads.  Unlike Kelly’s and Malzahns, the Air Raid offense centers on the passing game.  The core Air Raid coaches (Mumme, Leach) seek to throw the ball to the extreme, therefore perfecting their limited plays and creating some of the most potent offenses in NFL history. The simple reads, small playbook, and insistence on throwing help a quarterback get into a rhythm, which is one reason why Leach was able to plug in one record setting, below the radar recruit after another at Texas Tech and now Washington State.

The two most likely NFL coaches – Sumlin and Broyles – seek more balance in the offense.  Both have produced major NFL prospects in the last several years (Johnny Manziel for Sumlin and Griffin III for Broyles).  More importantly, both have been just as successful with quarterbacks who were seen as having little NFL potential.  They are masters of the spread passing game, and with so many quarterbacks throwing from the spread in youth football, high school, and college, it only makes sense that an experienced spread coach would ease the transition to the NFL for such quarterbacks.

(6) Run and shoot.  The run and shoot makes the list because it has already thrived in the NFL.  The offense is designed as “organized playground ball,” allowing receivers to find open space after the snap depending on the defense.  While the offense is difficult to master, it has thrived in the NFL and USFL with a variety of quarterbacks.  The reads required are different from the complex NFL progressions that make the position so difficult, and as the name implies, the ball is often thrown from outside the pocket.  Unfortunately, June Jones is one of the last remaining true run and shoot coaches, and the offense has probably been absorbed into the greater NFL schematics (see here), making it unlikely to return to the NFL in its true form.  If it does, expect success with proper modernization to adjust for modern blitz schemes.  As long time NFL coach Marty Shottenheimer once said: “I don’t think anybody stops it. They always make their yardage. What you hope to do is keep the scoring down the best you can to give yourself a chance to be successful.”

(7) Split back veer adapted to the pro game.  Admittedly, this is getting into science fiction territory.  I do not think that this will happen.  However, there are reasons to believe it could be successful in the NFL.  First of all, the veer scheme has worked in recent years (see: pistol).  The NFL is warming to the idea that the option game can succeed.  The split back veer is also a “pro” formation – the split backs are in the same alignment as the original Bill Walsh west coast offense and the original Edwards BYU/Air Raid configuration.  The offense is designed for a fast, tough, smart, competitive quarterback, which are easier to find than true drop back quarterbacks.  The reads in the pass game are simplified by the potency of the run game.  Like the wing t, the split back veer has a system for play calling, with answers for every defense imaginable.  With multiple options after the snap on every play, in theory the defense is never “right.”  This is part of the reason that the offense has driven some of the most successful programs in the country, from De La Salle high school in Concord, CA, to NCAA division II power Carson Newman.

With the professionalism and skill of NFL players, the most often cited drawback of the offense (poor passing game) could be overcome with a reliance on simple, proven concepts, such as those found in the Air Raid or run and shoot systems.  Like many offenses on this list, the potency of the run game would create a strong play action passing game with easier quarterback reads.

Of course, the split back veer would require a full commitment that is unlikely to happen.  The offensive line would be in unbalanced, forward leaning stances, as would the running backs.  The quarterbacks would need to learn how to protect themselves in the run game, or face a severe beating.

It won’t happen, but it would be interesting.

Apr 232014
 

In 2013, the consensus top two teams in the NFL (Seahawks, 49ers) were led by young quarterbacks on their rookie contracts. In 2012, the Super Bowl contestants were led by young quarterbacks who hadn’t yet signed monster extensions (Ravens, 49ers).

Contrary to popular wisdom that says the key to winning a Super Bowl is a star veteran quarterback, recent history is filled with examples of young, inexpensive quarterbacks leading their team to victory: Russell Wilson, Joe Flacco, Aaron Rodgers, Ben Roethlisberger (his first championship), Tom Brady (his first championship, though Drew Bledsoe was on the roster), and Kurt Warner.

The key reason for this phenomenon is obvious: the cheaper the quarterback, the more money available to pay the remainder of the roster. A team with a decent, cheap quarterback has the best of both worlds: they have quality at the most important position on the field, but also have more cap freedom than teams with established quarterbacks. The Seahawks and 49ers both exemplified this point. Both quarterbacks were on rookie contracts. The remainder of each roster was loaded with stars. The offensive and defensive lines of both teams were dominant. Each had a star running back. The 49ers had all time great group of linebackers and a solid secondary, while the Seahawks had a solid set of linebackers and an all time great group of defensive backs. Both had expensive, dangerous pass catchers. And the quarterbacks played great – Wilson making the correct decisions and key plays to win a Super Bowl, and Kaepernick at times putting his offense on his back. More relevant to this conversation, the young quarterbacks played in systems that were designed to capitalize on their strengths and which did not rely primarily on them throwing a multitude of traditional drop back pocket passes each game.

The cautionary tale for what can happen after a Super Bowl victory is the Baltimore Ravens of 2013. Fresh off of their championship, Joe Flacco commanded a salary ($120 million) commensurate with other Super Bowl winning quarterbacks. This salary in effect pushed his most dependable target – Anquan Boldin – out the door. This was one key reason why the Ravens finished their Super Bowl defense at 8-8, 3rd in their division, and missed the playoffs.

The Seahawks won the Super Bowl with an all time great defense, a strong running game, and a young quarterback on his rookie contract who made key throws and did not make mistakes. They will soon need to pay that quarterback. It is no coincidence that they let key Super Bowl contributors walk in the offseason, such as Golden Tate, Red Bryant, Chris Clemons, Clinton McDonald, and Breno Giacomini.

Of course, most teams feel “stuck” to pay such a quarterback, at the expense of the rest of their roster.

But what if an NFL team decided against doing so? What if they refused to pay a quarterback more than any other position on the field? Is it possible that a coach and organization would say, for example, that we will never pay a quarterback more than $10 million per year? That we will build a superior team and system, so that we are confident in our ability to win without a traditional “franchise” quarterback? That we can create a system where the quarterback is easily replaced, and that the fortunes of our team will not rest so heavily on one position?

At first glance, this seems unlikely. But the NFL is changing. College systems and coaches were not supposed to succeed in the NFL. Yet in the last two years, the pistol offense (Redskins, 49ers to some extent) and its variation of the veer option (which is often mislabeled as the “read” option, and differs in that the first man on or outside the play side tackle is the option key, as opposed to a backside defender on the read option) has thrived. The 49ers scored 3 touchdowns on the veer scheme in the 2011 NFC Championship against the Falcons, while Robert Griffin III excelled in his rookie season primarily operating out of the pistol. Next, Chip Kelly brought his hurry up spread offense to the NFL. It proved effective with two quarterbacks who contrast one another in almost every way – Michael Vick and Nick Foles – as the Eagles exceeded expectations in making the playoffs.

We know that the rarest commodity in football is the top flight drop back passer. In any given season, there are 10-15 men on the planet who prove capable of successfully operating a traditional NFL passing offense as the focal point of that offense. Installing an offense that can take advantage of a non traditional, interchangeable quarterback would be a huge risk. But perhaps the bigger risk is continuing to hit one’s head against the wall, when decades of evidence show that operating a “pro” style offense requires a commodity that less than half of the teams possess at any given time. And even the teams who do possess a competent quarterback are one injury away from disaster.

In part two, we will look at the systems and coaches who could work with a cheaper, “interchangeable” quarterback system, from Chip Kelly’s zone blocking spread to Gus Malzahn’s wing t spread to Jim Harbaugh’s power scheme to the pistol to a variation of the split back veer to the run and shoot and the Air Raid craze.