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Jan 032015
 

The Dallas Cowboys run game has vaulted them into the playoffs, providing a strong offensive identity for a team that has struggled to break into the elite ranks of the NFL. This run game is nothing revolutionary; to the contrary, it is a simple, zone based scheme. NFL fans often view the word “simple” as an insult – with the apparent conventional thinking being that an offense must be complex and a coach must vary his schemes every week in order to confound defenses. While there is truth to the notion that game planning and varied schematics are essential in the NFL, the 2014 Cowboys achieved success by investing in their offensive line and getting great at their base schemes, and using those base schemes over and over again to open large holes for DeMarco Murray, who led the NFL in rushing by almost 500 yards.

The first thing to note is that – as mentioned above – the Cowboys have invested heavily in their offensive line with high draft picks, and it has paid off. Their line as a unit is agile, smart, and does a great job of sustaining blocks. The second thing to note, however, is that they do not – as a general rule – blow the opposition off the ball. Covering up the defense – aka getting bodies on bodies and taking defenders where the defenders want to go – is more important to their success than is drive blocking those defenders down the field. As illustrated below in their week 14 game against the Chicago Bears, in which Murray ran for his season high of 179 yards, the Cowboys’ offensive linemen took great angles, prevented penetration, were patient with their blocks, and therefore opened numerous creases for Murray and the Cowboys to exploit. It wasn’t rocket science; it was great, sustainable execution.

As Murray receives the inside zone hand off, his line covers up the Chicago defensive line

As Murray receives the inside zone handoff, his line covers up the Chicago defensive line

The Bears haven't been blown off the ball, but a wide running lane opens up as Cowboys blockers stay engaged to defenders.  Murray goes for 8 yards on the play.

The Bears haven’t been blown off the ball, but a wide running lane opens as Cowboys blockers stay engaged to defenders. Murray goes for 8 yards on the play.

Joseph Randle takes the outside zone handoff.  The angles are flatter on the outside zone, but the result is the same: Cowboys blockers engaged with Bears defenders.

Joseph Randle takes the outside zone handoff. The angles are flatter on the outside zone, but the result is the same: Cowboys blockers engaged with Bears defenders.

Once again, a crease develops as Cowboys offensive linemen stay engaged on their blocks, and Randle exploits it for a 17 yard touchdown run.

Once again, a crease develops as Cowboys offensive linemen stay engaged on their blocks, and Randle exploits it for a 17 yard touchdown run.

One of the best plays in the Cowboys run game has been their counter, which has become an essential (and prolific) compliment to their zone game.  Their counter resembles a classic pin and pull scheme, with both guards pulling as the remaining blockers pin down the defenders shaded to the right.  Murray and Tony Romo simulate their initial footwork of the Cowboy zone package to set up the counter.

One of the best plays in the Cowboys run game has been their counter, which has become an essential (and prolific) compliment to their zone game. Their counter resembles a classic pin and pull scheme, with both guards pulling to the left as the remaining blockers pin down the defenders to the right. Murray and Tony Romo simulate their initial footwork of the Cowboy zone package to set up the counter.

Pulling guard Ronald Leary's crushing block highlights another Cowboys victory at the point of attack. Solid offensive line execution and linebacker over-pursuit opens a massive cutback lane, which Murray exploits for a 40 yard gain.

Pulling guard Ronald Leary’s crushing block highlights another Cowboys victory at the point of attack. Solid offensive line execution and linebacker over-pursuit opens a massive cutback lane, which Murray exploits for a 40 yard gain.

Another look at the Cowboys inside zone.  A strong run game is often most damaging late in the game, and there is no exception here.  Again, the Cowboys cover up the Bears front as Murray receives the ball.

Another look at the Cowboys inside zone. A strong run game is often most damaging late in the game, and there is no exception on this play. Again, the Cowboys cover up the Bears front as Murray receives the handoff.

Murray prods the hole with patience, and then explodes through another crease forged by his athletic offensive line for a 26 yard gain.

Murray prods the hole with patience, and then explodes through another crease forged by his athletic offensive line for a 26 yard gain.

A great, physical run game does not have to mean blowing the defense off the ball. Intelligence does not have to mean complexity. The Cowboys have based their offensive attack on a few plays that they execute well, once again proving that – even at the highest level of the sport – execution is the most important factor in achieving success. Obviously, they are not as simple as a Pop Warner team. They use a variety of formations and motions and shifts as well as their complimentary passing game to aid in running the ball. But, at their core, they share an important similarity with many lower level powerhouses: they are great at a few things, and everything else builds form there.

May 082014
 

Stockpiling draft picks in the NFL forms the basis for successful franchises such as the New England Patriots, Baltimore Ravens, and San Francisco 49ers. It is where team building, the salary cap, and probability intersect.

There are downsides to stockpiling picks. The extra draft picks are acquired by trading down in the draft or a previous draft (thus forfeiting a chance at a theoretically better prospect), or by trading a veteran for a draft pick (thus losing a proven entity), or by acquiring compensatory picks (which are given out by the NFL when a team loses a valuable free agent).

Why would some of the best franchises in the NFL consistently trade higher picks for multiple lower picks, trade veteran players, and let solid NFL players walk in free agency?

First of all, these teams have chosen to build through the draft, and not free agency. This has value that cannot be analyzed by thinking in terms of video game football, i.e. acquiring the most talented players possible. Instead, these teams seek to draft players who fit their program personality wise, and who fit their schematics athletically. This allows the teams to mold an “impressionable” rookie into their system, which has a greater chance for success than asking a veteran from another system to do so.

Once the drafted players are on the roster, another evaluation process occurs. These teams will constantly analyze which of their young players, do, in fact, fit the structure of the team both on and off the field. While they can learn about a free agent’s reputation on and off the field, it does not compare with their ability to know and analyze their own players.

This is vital in regards to the salary cap. Generally speaking, a team can extend the contracts of their own players for less money than if those players reached the open market. Signing a contract early is beneficial for a player, because it is a violent sport where injury can ruin a career at any moment, and it is valuable to sacrifice a chance at the free market in order to gain guaranteed money and eliminate the risk of losing everything because of injury. The team wins by keeping costs down; the player wins by getting financial security earlier.

Some of the multitude of draftees that these teams have will not re-sign. But these teams still rely on players being productive on their rookie contracts, because it is a cheap source of labor which keeps costs down so that the desired former draft picks can be extended, and the team can remain under the salary cap.

This is why probability is so important. It is impossible to “get it right” on every draft pick. Having more draft picks increases the probability that a few of the draft picks may end up being “keepers” on the roster.

Some will get cut before training camp. Some will contribute during their rookie season and beyond. A few from each draft class will get contract extensions to stay with the team. THESE players are as sure a bet as there can be in the NFL – the team has had years to scout them as players and as people from within their own locker room.

After years of this steady building and stockpiling of draft picks, the extended players from various draft classes make up the team.

In essence, these teams have the best of both worlds: they have found players who they KNOW fit their system, and they can keep those players on the roster for cheaper than their fair market value would dictate. The increased picks also allow the teams to more freely choose the best player available in the draft – instead of focusing on need – because there are more picks to address needs later in the draft. This gives another advantage in fielding the best players possible to fit their system and resign at value.

Aside from team building, stockpiling draft picks does give a team the opportunity to move up in the draft should they want to. The 2013 49ers are a great example – they identified a player they wanted to get, traded up 13 picks in the first round to get him (which they were able to do because of their excess draft picks), and drafted Eric Reid, an immediate starter at safety who solidified their defensive backfield and went to the Pro Bowl his first season.

Stockpiling also means better picks in later drafts. In 1995, the Cleveland Browns – with both head coach Bill Belichick and executive Ozzie Newsome having influence – traded the #10 pick in the draft to the 49ers, who selected receiver JJ Stokes. In return, the Browns/Ravens received 4 draft picks, including the 49ers’ first round pick in 1996.

In 1996, with their own pick at #4, the Ravens chose the best player available, a left tackle from UCLA. They were criticized, because they already had a solid starting left tackle – Tony Jones (who would go on to a pro bowl and to start for two Denver Bronco Super Bowl champions). The player they selected, however, became arguably the best left tackle of all time – Jonathan Ogden.

But the Ravens were not done. With the 49er’s draft pick – #26 – they again drafted the best player available. This time, they selected Ray Lewis.

Belichick and Newsome had witnessed the virtue of patience in 1995, that led to drafting two hall of fame players in 1996, which set the Ravens franchise on a path to success that has not yet ceased. It is not surprising that the Patriots (under Belichick) and the Ravens (under Newsome) continue to build through the draft.

And in support of the theory of stockpiling draft picks in order to increase probability of success, Belichick’s Patriots would later receive four compensatory selections in the 2000 draft to compensate for the losses of linebacker Todd Collins, punter Tom Tupa, defensive tackle Mark Wheeler and offensive lineman Dave Wohlabaugh in free agency. This gave his team four extra chances at selecting a contributor, even if the chances of a late round draft pick lasting in the NFL are slim. Few people took note of pick 199, their compensatory selection at the bottom of round 6. With that pick, they selected Tom Brady.

The stockpiling draft pick system also perpetuates itself: Because these teams let free agents walk, and do not build extensively through free agency, they often receive compensatory picks which help them to stockpile draft picks.

The process can be slow, but it is the recipe for a healthy, system driven NFL team with a group of players who are more likely to be unified in sharing the vision of the coaching staff. Such cohesiveness is an intangible – and necessary – element of winning football, which is one reason why famous “free agent splash” teams (the recent Washington Redskins being a prime example) so often struggle to find consistent success.