Total American Football

Dallas Cowboys run game: Simplicity and Execution

Bears, Blocking scheme, Cowboys, Offense, Play calling, Run game, Zone blocking No Responses »

Jan 032015

The Dallas Cowboys run game has vaulted them into the playoffs, providing a strong offensive identity for a team that has struggled to break into the elite ranks of the NFL. This run game is nothing revolutionary; to the contrary, it is a simple, zone based scheme. NFL fans often view the word “simple” as an insult – with the apparent conventional thinking being that an offense must be complex and a coach must vary his schemes every week in order to confound defenses. While there is truth to the notion that game planning and varied schematics are essential in the NFL, the 2014 Cowboys achieved success by investing in their offensive line and getting great at their base schemes, and using those base schemes over and over again to open large holes for DeMarco Murray, who led the NFL in rushing by almost 500 yards.

The first thing to note is that – as mentioned above – the Cowboys have invested heavily in their offensive line with high draft picks, and it has paid off. Their line as a unit is agile, smart, and does a great job of sustaining blocks. The second thing to note, however, is that they do not – as a general rule – blow the opposition off the ball. Covering up the defense – aka getting bodies on bodies and taking defenders where the defenders want to go – is more important to their success than is drive blocking those defenders down the field. As illustrated below in their week 14 game against the Chicago Bears, in which Murray ran for his season high of 179 yards, the Cowboys’ offensive linemen took great angles, prevented penetration, were patient with their blocks, and therefore opened numerous creases for Murray and the Cowboys to exploit. It wasn’t rocket science; it was great, sustainable execution.

As Murray receives the inside zone handoff, his line covers up the Chicago defensive line

The Bears haven't been blown off the ball, but a wide running lane opens up as Cowboys blockers stay engaged to defenders. Murray goes for 8 yards on the play.

The Bears haven’t been blown off the ball, but a wide running lane opens as Cowboys blockers stay engaged to defenders. Murray goes for 8 yards on the play.

Joseph Randle takes the outside zone handoff. The angles are flatter on the outside zone, but the result is the same: Cowboys blockers engaged with Bears defenders.

Once again, a crease develops as Cowboys offensive linemen stay engaged on their blocks, and Randle exploits it for a 17 yard touchdown run.

One of the best plays in the Cowboys run game has been their counter, which has become an essential (and prolific) compliment to their zone game. Their counter resembles a classic pin and pull scheme, with both guards pulling to the left as the remaining blockers pin down the defenders to the right. Murray and Tony Romo simulate their initial footwork of the Cowboy zone package to set up the counter.

Pulling guard Ronald Leary’s crushing block highlights another Cowboys victory at the point of attack. Solid offensive line execution and linebacker over-pursuit opens a massive cutback lane, which Murray exploits for a 40 yard gain.

Another look at the Cowboys inside zone. A strong run game is often most damaging late in the game, and there is no exception here. Again, the Cowboys cover up the Bears front as Murray receives the ball.

Another look at the Cowboys inside zone. A strong run game is often most damaging late in the game, and there is no exception on this play. Again, the Cowboys cover up the Bears front as Murray receives the handoff.

Murray prods the hole with patience, and then explodes through another crease forged by his athletic offensive line for a 26 yard gain.

A great, physical run game does not have to mean blowing the defense off the ball. Intelligence does not have to mean complexity. The Cowboys have based their offensive attack on a few plays that they execute well, once again proving that – even at the highest level of the sport – execution is the most important factor in achieving success. Obviously, they are not as simple as a Pop Warner team. They use a variety of formations and motions and shifts as well as their complimentary passing game to aid in running the ball. But, at their core, they share an important similarity with many lower level powerhouses: they are great at a few things, and everything else builds form there.

A sensible 8 team college football playoff proposal

College Football, College Football Playoff, History, Proposal, Speculative 1 Response »

Dec 172014

As promised in my 16 team playoff proposal, this is my 8 team playoff proposal. The 8 team playoff is much easier. Nothing changes in the structure and alignment of the conferences. The rule is simple: each of the 5 power conferences get an automatic bid, and there are 3 at large bids.

Though I prefer 16 teams, this scenario is an improvement over 4 teams. Most importantly, the automatic bids encourage better scheduling from power conference schools, because they will never be eliminated from playoff contention due to of a non-conference loss. Also, the 9th team in an 8 team system will not have as good of an argument for inclusion as the 5th team in a 4 team system. This year, for example, there were 6 teams with rock solid playoff resumes. There was large debate over the final 2 spots, with Baylor and TCU ultimately losing out. The final spots in the 8 team tournament would also be a mess, but none of the two and three loss teams vying for those spots had near the claim that one loss Baylor and TCU have this year.

One major problem would still exist: conference scheduling inequality. Simply put, it is not fair that some conferences play 8 conference games, while others play 9 games. Some have conference championship games, while others do not. There is no excuse for this inequality to not be rectified in the future. Along those lines, one of the primary reasons why I prefer a 16 team tournament is that it would allow 10 team conferences where every team plays 9 conference games, with no conference championship games. This would eliminate the issues most often discussed in reference to the 14 team Southeastern Conference. The SEC plays an 8 game conference schedule among those 14 teams, and its members rarely travel outside of the SEC blueprint. This leads to more good records (one less conference game equals 14 fewer conference losses), and can result in a situation like the 2014 Missouri Tigers. Missouri won the SEC East, in large part because they missed playing the top 5 teams in the SEC West (Alabama, Mississippi State, Ole Miss, Auburn, and LSU). This left them with an impressive record that put them in the running for a spot in an 8 team playoff, with a regular season schedule that featured only one team who would be ranked at the end of the season. Their non-conference schedule featured wins over a lower division opponent and two mid-majors, and a home loss to Indiana, a team that finished with a 4-8 record.

Such inequalities need to be addressed, no matter the playoff format.

I would also recommend playing no conference championship games (which would go hand in hand with smaller conferences). On top of conference scheduling inequality, the situation will arise where teams who deserve to get in the playoffs will have another chance to look worse, while a team who did not win their division could sneak in ahead of such a team, without playing in a conference championship game. Teams that made the playoffs without playing a conference championship game would also have an advantage against teams who did have the extra game to get beaten up and fatigued.

The other primary reason why I prefer a 16 team tournament is equality. In the 8 team tournament, mid-majors still do not have a realistic chance to compete for a championship. A mid-major would need an undefeated record, most likely a good reputation, and good non-conference victories. A good preseason reputation and good non-conference victories is a hard match, however, because major programs are often wary of scheduling strong mid-major programs.

All that being said, my 8 team tournament would be:

Florida State 13-0 (ACC automatic)
Alabama 12-1 (SEC automatic)
Oregon 12-1 (Pac 12 automatic)
Ohio State 12-1 (Big 10 automatic)
Baylor 11-1 (Big 12 automatic [though we don’t actually know who the Big 12 would have chosen for the automatic bid, as they chose co-champions])
TCU 11-1 (Big 12 at large)
Arizona 10-3 (Pac 12 at large)
Michigan State 10-2 (Big 10 at large)

There would be huge debate over the final two spots of the field. I chose Arizona and Michigan State, but the committee (going by their rankings) would have chosen Mississippi State and Michigan State. Georgia Tech was also in the mix for me.

My rationale in choosing Arizona and Michigan State: Arizona and Georgia Tech should not be penalized for losing their conference championship game, while Michigan State and Mississippi State did not play in theirs. Arizona separates themselves from the competition by playing a 9 game conference schedule, and by beating #3 Oregon earlier in the season, the best win among the four competing teams. They also beat post-season ranked Utah and Arizona State.

The other teams each played 8 game conference schedules. Mississippi State beat post-season ranked LSU (22) and Auburn (19). Both of their losses were good, against #2 Alabama and ranked, 9-3 Ole Miss. But, like Missouri, they also missed the top five teams from the opposite division (Missouri, Georgia, Florida, Tennessee, and South Carolina), instead drawing Kentucky and Vanderbilt. They also lost two of their last three games. Part of their exclusion is punitive: their out of conference schedule was atrocious. Michigan State’s only two losses were to playoff teams – Oregon and Ohio State, though they only had one win against a post-season ranked opponent – Nebraska. This decision is a nod towards their scheduling Oregon at Oregon, because if they didn’t, they would have been 11-1 and in the mix for a 5 or 6 seed along with Baylor and TCU. Their courage in scheduling should be rewarded.

Georgia Tech also has a strong claim due to their close loss to Florida State in a conference championship game, but are undone by their two losses to unranked opponents (albeit a solid 9-3 Duke team and a not-terrible 6-6 North Carolina).

Either way, the final two seeds are a mess, which illustrates why I believe a 16 team tournament is a better solution.

The bracket would look like this:

(1) Florida State hosts (8) Michigan State
(4) Ohio State hosts (5) Baylor

(3) Oregon hosts (6) TCU
(2) Alabama hosts (7) Arizona

Not surprisingly, every opening matchup is marquee, (which wouldn’t be the case in a 16 team tournament with automatic bids for mid-majors). Florida State, which hasn’t looked overly impressive while staying undefeated, plays one of the most physical teams in the country in Michigan State. Ohio State hosts Baylor in a matchup of wide open, explosive offenses. The same can be said when Oregon hosts TCU. Alabama gets what appears on paper to be the easiest matchup, but Arizona’s prolific offense can give any team fits, and they have already proven that they can beat a top opponent with their victory over Oregon.

What do you think? Do you prefer this over a 16 team tournament?

A sensible 16 team college football playoff proposal

College Football, College Football Playoff, History, Proposal, Speculative 4 Responses »

Dec 092014

While there is much (justified) excitement about the first ever college football playoff, 4 teams is not enough.

This proposal is for a 16 team tournament. While this may seem large, every other division of college football can do it, often with harder academic burdens on the players. The FCS and Division 2 finish with a 24 team tournament, while division 3 finishes with a 32 team tournament.

The benefits: (1) Harder out of conference scheduling is encouraged, because no out of conference defeat will spell the end of playoff hopes. (2) Every team will have a legitimate chance to be champion. There will be no undefeated teams left without a chance.

The basics of the system:

Each conference consists of 10 teams. All teams will play 9 conference games. Each conference must declare a conference champion (via a declared method of their choosing), and there are no conference championship games (to enhance the importance of regular season games).

Each conference champion gets a conditional automatic bid.*

The remaining, at large bids are decided by a committee (much like the one in current use).

The top independent team receives an automatic bid by finishing in the top 10 of the committee rankings. Otherwise, they are eligible for at large bids (the distinction is small and will almost always be moot).

The 4 quarterfinal, 2 semifinal games, and 1 championship game will rotate among traditional bowls (with the “most” traditional rotating among the final 3 games). The first round games are hosted by the better seed. The semifinals will take place on New Year’s day, with the Rose Bowl being the first semifinal.

Outside of the 16 teams in the tournament, the remainder of the bowl games will exist as they always have.

Easy enough, right? Not exactly.

There will need to be massive restructuring of conferences. This seems straightforward at first glance, but there are currently 128 FBS teams. To have the minimum number of independent teams, this would mean 12 conferences of 10 teams. This would mean 12 automatic bids, and only 4 at large bids. I believe that the ideal number would be 11 conferences with 5 auto bids. In order to make the system work, it would be wise for the NCAA to limit the number of teams reaching the FBS level, create a promotion/relegation system, or other ideas that are not the topic for this post. In the meantime, the lack of at large bids convinced me to propose one more key – and controversial – provision:

*To guarantee an auto bid, a team must win at least 9 games. This provision is to guard against the (most likely mid major) conference champion who does not belong in the field. 9 wins and 3 losses ensures that the team is good. Every team in the country can lose every non-conference game on their schedule, and still guarantee a playoff berth with a perfect conference record. What we don’t want is a team who loses 2 or 3 non-conference games, loses a couple of games in conference, and still wins the conference championship. Take 2014 Louisiana Tech. With my conference realignment, they would have won the Big West championship with an 8-4 record. They lost 1 game in conference, 2 games to ranked opponents in non-conference, but also lost to FCS Northwestern State. A team that loses to an FCS school – or which loses to all 3 non-conference opponents, plus a conference loss, or various other combinations – does not deserve to be in a 16 team playoff.

The downside to this provision is that it would discourage mid majors from scheduling difficult out of conference opponents. I believe, however, that the benefit of creating an extra at large bid for a more deserving team outweighs this detriment. The burden of proof, so to speak, would still be in favor of allowing the team to join the tournament. The committee would be required to give express reasoning as to why the team was left out of the field. If, say, the SEC champion lost twice out of conference and twice in conference, the committee could still include them in the field. In this case, the committee would have no trouble pointing to the FCS loss as a reason why Louisiana Tech should be excluded from the field.

Now, on to the conference realignments. The teams are not placed in order, aside from the teams receiving bids to the tournament. I attempted to reorganize the 10 team conferences for historical and/or geographic reasons, reinserting teams to old conferences or ones that make sense, and resurrecting old conferences. It wasn’t always easy, and was sometimes arbitrary. I included notes where I felt necessary.

ACC
Florida State – auto bid 12-0
Georgia Tech – 10-2
Clemson
South Carolina
Duke
Maryland
North Carolina
North Carolina State
Virginia
Wake Forest

Big East
Louisville – auto bid 9-3
Virginia Tech
Miami (FL)
Syracuse
West Virginia
Boston College
Rutgers
Temple
Pittsburgh
Penn State (an independent until 1992, this time Penn State joins the Big East, rather than being the 11th big 10 team).

Big 8
Missouri – auto bid 10-2 (Missouri gets the nod over 10-2 Colorado State due to a superior conference record)
Nebraska
Kansas State
Kansas
Oklahoma
Oklahoma State
Iowa State
Colorado
Colorado State (makes geographic sense)
Cincinnati (willing to travel, this would be Cincinnati’s 7th conference)

Big 10
Ohio State – auto bid 11-1
Michigan State – 10-2
Illinois
Michigan
Minnesota
Northwestern
Purdue
Wisconsin
Indiana
Iowa

Southwest Conference (it feels good to revive the legendary SWC, bringing back Arkansas, and adding newcomer UT San Antonio, a geographic, but mostly arbitrary choice over other “new” Texas schools…)
Baylor – auto bid 11-1 (wins tie breaker due to head-to-head victory over TCU)
TCU – 11-1
Texas
Texas A&M
Houston
SMU
Texas Tech
Rice
Arkansas
UTSA

Southeastern Conference
Alabama – auto bid 11-1
Mississippi State – 10-2
Florida
Tennessee
Georgia
Kentucky
Vanderbilt
Auburn
LSU
Ole Miss

Pac 10
Oregon – auto bid 11-1
Arizona – 10-2
Oregon State
Washington
Washington State
California
Stanford
USC
UCLA
Arizona State

WAC
Boise State – auto bid 10-2
BYU
Utah
Air Force
San Diego State
Wyoming
Fresno State
New Mexico
Hawaii
UTEP

Big West Conference
Louisiana Tech (continuing an odd tradition of joining a western conference) – auto bid 8-4, but is excluded from the tournament by virtue of not reaching 9 wins.
Nevada
Utah State
New Mexico State
San Jose State
UNLV
North Texas
Idaho
Texas State
Tulsa

Mid-American Conference
Northern Illinois – auto bid 10-2
Toledo
Miami (Ohio)
Ball State
Western Michigan
Eastern Michigan
Bowling Green
Central Michigan
Ohio
Kent State

Conference USA
Marshall – auto bid 11-1
Middle Tennessee
UAB
WKU
Arkansas State
FIU
Florida Atlantic
Southern Miss
Tulane
Akron

American Athletic Conference
Georgia Southern – auto 9-3 (perfect 8-0 conference record gives them the nod over Memphis and UCF)
Memphis – 9-3 7-1
UCF – 9-3 7-1
East Carolina
South Florida
Connecticut
Buffalo
UMass
Louisiana-Lafayette
Louisiana-Monroe

Independent
Appalachian State
Old Dominion
South Alabama
Troy
Georgia State
Notre Dame
Army
Navy

The tournament would look like this:

Florida State 12-0 (ACC)
Alabama 11-1 (SEC)
Oregon 11-1 (Pac 10)
Ohio State 11-1 (Big 10)
Baylor 11-1 (SWC)
TCU* 11-1 (SWC at large)
Mississippi State* 10-2 (SEC at large)
Michigan State* 10-2 (Big 10 at large)
Arizona* 10-2 (Pac 10 at large)
Georgia Tech* 10-2 (ACC at large)
Missouri 10-2 (Big 8)
Louisville 9-3 (Big East)
Boise State 10-2 (WAC)
Marshall 11-1 (Conference USA)
Northern Illinois 10-2 (MAC)
Georgia Southern 9-3 (AAC)
~~Louisiana Tech 8-4 (Big West)~~

(1) Florida State v (16) Georgia Southern
(8) Michigan State v (9) Arizona

(5) Baylor v (12) Louisville
(4) Ohio State v (13) Boise State

(6) TCU v (11) Missouri
(3) Oregon v (14) Marshall

(7) Mississippi State v (10) Georgia Tech
(2) Alabama v (15) Northern Illinois

A few notes and observations:

Setting up this fictional 16 team tournament was more difficult than I imagined. The basic rules (9 game conference schedules, automatic bids for all conference champions) seem simple, but the 128 teams at the FBS level present a logistical challenge. Still, the 16 team tournament is superior to the 4 team product. This year, the biggest problem with the 4 team tournament was that a reasonable argument could be made that Baylor and TCU deserved to be in the final 4 just as much as the other one loss teams who made the field. In a 16 team tournament, they would get to prove their merit. And it provides justice for a team like Michigan State, who had the courage to travel to eventual #3 Oregon. Under the current 4 team playoff, if Michigan State had scheduled a patsy in place of Oregon (like Baylor or many of the teams from the SEC would have, for example), they would have been in the running for a playoff bid (their only other loss was to eventual #4 Ohio State). In the current system, they were punished for their bravery, despite the committee repeatedly saying that teams would be rewarded for scheduling (note: this isn’t the committee’s fault – 4 teams are simply not enough, and the 2 loss Spartans were rightfully not chosen ahead of the 1 loss teams). The 16 team tournament would have a much more realistic chance of making good on claims that scheduling matters.

Of course, there are (legitimate) arguments that this 16 team tournament is too watered down. True, teams the last 5 or 6 teams are probably not among the top 16 teams in the country. But I believe that it is a good balance, because in the future, one of those teams will be undefeated going into the tournament (Marshall was a two point conversion away from doing so), and there should be – at most – one undefeated champion at the end of each season. But note that I will also release a (shorter) 8 team playoff proposal in a future post (edit: see here for my 8 team playoff proposal).

Florida State is the defending national champion, scheduled well out of conference, has a 29 game winning streak, and is the only undefeated team in the country. They get the #1 seed. Arizona and Georgia Tech get the final at large bids by virtue of their 10 wins, narrowly beating out Wisconsin.

The matchups are intriguing. Florida State faces another option team (which they have struggled to stop this year) in Georgia Southern, a traditional lower division power. The Michigan State v Arizona 8 v 9 game is a battle between two power conference teams. The same goes for Baylor v Louisville and Mississippi State v Georgia Tech. Ohio State is a big favorite over Boise State, who is no stranger to achieving success as an underdog. Oregon is favored over Marshall, one of the few teams with as fast and as prolific on offense as Oregon has. Alabama v Northern Illinois doesn’t look good on paper…but giving Northern Illinois a chance is what the tournament is about.

The potential quarterfinal games would be epic: Florida State v Michigan State or Arizona. Baylor v Ohio State. TCU v Oregon. Mississippi State or Georgia Tech v Alabama.

And, of course, the semifinals would only get better.

What do you think?

The Philadelphia Eagles’ “Waggle” Pass

Chip Kelly, Gus Malzahn, LeSean McCoy, Offense, Pass game, Philadelphia Eagles, Quarterback play, Speculative, Waggle pass, Wing T, Zone read 1 Response »

Dec 032014

Chip Kelly is considered the NFL’s current innovative “genius.” But it is no secret that the bulk of Kelly’s offense is based upon basic, fundamentally sound, and proven schematics. When combined with spread principles and the up tempo pace of Kelly’s offense (and his practices), those proven schematics are the basis for Kelly’s attack.

Along those lines, one of Kelly’s favorite pass concepts is a football classic: the waggle pass. This play – and the space it creates for quarterback and receivers alike – is one reason why Kelly has been able to plug in multiple quarterbacks to his system with great success (Mark Sanchez taking over for Nick Foles being just the latest example), which is one reason why he tops my list of coaches who could make a cheap, interchangeable quarterback system work (see here). Though it is unclear if Kelly derived the concept directly from the waggle (or one of the many related plays and variations of play action and bootleg concepts), the plays are identical in many ways, most importantly in their ability to put multiple defenders in conflict.

The roots of the waggle pass are in the Delaware Wing T, developed by Dave Nelson in the 1950s. Since that time, the Wing T has been among the most influential offenses in American football, and is still one of the most common and successful offenses in the sport. At the heart of that offense is the waggle pass.

The classic Wing T waggle features buck sweep action to the right. The potency of the buck sweep demands respect. After the quarterback and the running back sell the fake, the quarterback boots to his left. There, the playside receiver usually runs a vertical route, while multiple backside receivers run crossing routes. The quarterback has a run pass option. The linebackers and safeties in particular are stressed by the play: they must respect the buck sweep action (which demands quick pursuit), while receivers cross their face to the opposite side of the field. The crossing patterns are difficult against either man or zone: against man, the receivers cross face and run away from defenders whose momentum may have started in the wrong direction; against zone, the leveled crossing routes take advantage of whether the linebackers and safeties react strong to the run, or drop too deep.

A “traditional” Wing T waggle pass (for further reading on the traditional waggle pass, see the great bucksweep.com for “The Waggle the Best Play in Football,” here):

Now, look at this Eagles touchdown from their Thanksgiving day victory over the Dallas Cowboys:

The Eagles’ waggle schematics. Notice the similarities to the traditional waggle pass. The Eagles fake their top running play (outside zone) to the right. The offensive line washes the defensive line to the right. Sanchez keeps to the left, while he has a playside comeback route and two deep crossing routes to choose from.

All 8 defenders in the Cowboys’ front react towards the run fake. Jordan Matthews, who will catch the touchdown pass, is moving in the other direction.

The tight view gives a closer look at linebackers in conflict. Both box linebackers react towards the run, while Matthews is primed to sneak behind them.

We see the traditional waggle quarterback run/pass option as Sanchez breaks the pocket. Though Sanchez is not a notorious run threat, he had already scored one rushing touchdown on the day. Defensive back C.J. Spillman (#37) reacts up towards this action, leaving a clear path for Matthews to glide behind. Furthermore, Sanchez has clear sight lines down the field – better than a quarterback could ever get from inside the pocket (another reason why Kelly’s quarterbacks thrive).

From a different angle, we see the space Matthews has as Sanchez breaks the pocket.

Just after catching the ball, we see that Matthews still has space, and a clear path to the end zone. An easy pattern with an easy quarterback read leads to the type of decision and throw that has allowed Kelly to find success with a myriad of quarterbacks.

From a different angle, we see the clear path that makes it easy to celebrate before the ball crosses the goal line.

Chip Kelly has enjoyed great success with quarterbacks on the national stage at the University of Oregon and with the Philadelphia Eagles, often with overlooked or – in the case of Mark Sanchez – discarded players. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it isn’t because he employs a rocket science system that confounds defenses. It is the packaging of simple, proven concepts – such as the waggle pass – in spread formations, executed to perfection and with great pace, that creates easy reads and open space for his quarterbacks to thrive.

Overplaying the cat and mouse game

Aaron Rodgers, Bears, Cover 1, Cover 2, Cover 3, Defense, Defensive philosophy, Packers, Pass defense 4 Responses »

Nov 142014

Overcomplexity in a defense can be dangerous (see here). The Chicago Bears gave us another example, this time in the context of excessive pre-snap checks.

A national television audience witnessed the six passing touchdown first half by Aaron Rodgers. Perhaps the most notable of the six was Jordy Nelson’s 73 yard touchdown reception. The play was – as was obvious to the naked eye – a blown coverage. But why was the coverage blown?

Before the snap, Aaron Rodgers performs a hard count, attempting to draw the Bears into the neutral zone. As he does so, the Bears show blitz, with six defenders on or near the line of scrimmage, and a seventh (linebacker Lance Briggs) creeping in that direction. Safety Chris Conte follows a receiver in motion from left to right, showing (or at least feigning) man coverage.

After the hard count and the motion, Rodgers stops, turns to face his receivers to the right (in a trips formation), and signals while making a call. At the same, we see Briggs turning to motion and call to his fellow defenders.

Rodgers turns to the line as Briggs yells to his teammates

The defenders begin to move, as Briggs continues shouting orders and motioning.

Moments before the snap, we see Bears defenders backing away from the line of scrimmage. Conte backs up, showing (or feigning) zone.

The structure of the defense becomes clear as soon as the ball is snapped. There is one high safety, and cornerbacks in press. There are several options for what the Bears might be trying to play. The most likely are cover 3 or man free. In either of those options, the press cornerbacks would be covering any vertical pattern by the #1 receiver, who they are aligned over.

Cornerbacks in press, free safety deep in the middle of the field.

In the cover 3 or man free scenario, the answer to who blew the coverage is clear: the cornerback. There is no doubt that he played as if he had help over the top, forcing the receiver inside while jumping on a shallow route. This is classic cover 2 cornerback play.

The cornerback has forced Nelson to take an inside route, while eyeing a receiver who threatens the flat - classic cover 2 cornerback play.

The cornerback has forced Nelson to take an inside route, while eying a receiver who threatens the flat – classic cover 2 cornerback play.

Other (less likely) possibilities are (1) that Conte should have retreated in cover 2. This is not likely, because the free safety did not shade to the other half of the field. Alternatively, (2) the free safety may have been the guilty party, playing a version of cover 2 where he is over the top to Nelson’s side, while the opposite cornerback manned the other deep half, or (3) a version of cover 3 where the middle linebacker (who is dropping deep on the play) takes the deep third.

Nelson catches the ball. The free safety has not reacted from his deep middle zone, the cornerback trails from his cover 2 positioning, and the middle linebacker chases from his zone.

For the purposes of this post, knowing who was responsible for the coverage bust is immaterial. A particular player can be blamed, but the point is – as a coach – that someone did not get the message. “Not getting the message” is an inherent risk in playing such a cat and mouse game, and the Bears got burned.

The benefit that the Bears were striving for is clear. The opposing quarterback has just changed the play in order to beat our defense, so we will change our defense in order to frustrate his intentions. And there is no doubt that the caliber of quarterbacks in the NFL requires a defense to show different looks, lest a great quarterback such as Rodgers pick them apart. On paper, it makes sense to attempt to frustrate Rodgers in this fashion, especially towards the end of the play clock, when Rodgers cannot audible again. But the game is played on a noisy field in front of thousands of fans, where communication is difficult, and the draining play clock also means that the Bears have little time to make their adjustments. Players need to call and receive the new front/blitz/coverage, adjust their alignments, and mentally digest the information – all in the final few seconds before the snap. It can – and does, on many occasions – work. But when it doesn’t work – as is often the case – it can lead to catastrophe for a defense. The defensive coordinator must always consider this balancing, essentially asking himself “Is the benefit of confusing the offense worth the risk of confusing ourselves?” There is a fine line between creating confusion for the opposition and creating confusion for yourself, and in this case, the Bears beat themselves before the ball was put into play.

How man coverage can weaken run defense

Air Raid, California Golden Bears, Cover 1, Defense, Defensive philosophy, Man coverage, Michigan State, Offense, Pass defense, Play calling, Run defense, Run game, Seahawks, Tony Franklin No Responses »

Nov 082014

Many coaches and fans believe that a man pass coverage scheme leads to better run defense. This is because – the thinking goes – primary run defenders are given more freedom to attack the run with aggressiveness, while primary pass defenders focus on covering receivers. If the defensive coordinator is willing to play with limited help over the top, it also allows the defense to load the box to stop the run. For example, in a common “man free” scheme against a traditional two wide receiver set, the two cornerbacks lock up the wide receivers and the safety plays over the top, while the remaining 8 defenders can play close to the line to stop the run.

Such thinking has extended to defend spread offenses. Against a “spread to run” opponent, one strategy is to lock in man coverage on the receivers to take away quick patterns, while giving your team a numerical advantage inside the box. Because of this numbers advantage, the defense can be aggressive with run fits, blitzes, and stunts. The numbers advantage can often be achieved even while keeping two safeties on the field, because of pattern matching principles, which allow outside linebackers to stay closer to the box and safeties to play the run more aggressively (further explained below).

Man coverage principles can, however, weaken a run defense.

The primary reason is because it is very difficult for a defender to play man coverage and maintain proper run discipline and pursuit. With responsibility focused on a receiver, a defender is much more likely to be run out of a play by a receiver simulating a pass pattern. Edge defenders will have difficulty preventing the ball from being run outside when they also have to defend routes that take them inside. The offense can also more easily manipulate defensive alignment in order to break contain. For example, a trips formation to one side with a tight end on the other side may lead to only a linebacker standing between the offense and the sideline on the tight end side of the field. If the offense can break that contain (against a linebacker instead of a defensive back), they have a big play on their hands.

Enter California and their prolific offensive coordinator, Tony Franklin, against the Oregon State Beavers. Oregon State under Mike Riley is and continues to be one of the most sound and well coached programs in the country, consistently fielding rugged, overachieving teams. They came into the game with a strong pass defense that seemed to match up well against Cal’s powerful air attack. In this game, however, their man principles hurt their ability to stop Cal’s running game.

As one can see below, Oregon State lines up in a two safety shell against Cal’s four wide receiver (2×2) offensive set. The outside linebackers split the distance between the #2 receivers (the 2nd receiver from the outside) and the offensive tackles. The safeties play inside shade of the #2 receivers, while the cornerbacks line up in press coverage on the wide receivers.

What is not clear is whether the Beavers are playing true man coverage, or pattern matching principles. Pattern matching is a method by which particular defenders lock in man coverage against certain offensive patterns, while playing zone against others. For example, a typical pattern matching scheme is for the outside linebackers to cover any short out route by a #2 receiver in man coverage, while they would re-route any vertical stem by the #2 receiver, and then look to help in the flat. The safety would cover any vertical route (more than 7-10 yards) by #2, while the CB would cover any vertical route by #1. In many ways, pattern matching combines the best of both zone and man coverage – nobody has to cover every pattern, so they can be more aggressive against the run, while maintaining the benefits of man coverage against the pass. Teams such as Michigan State (which bases out of a 2 safety, cover 4 pattern matching defense) and the Seattle Seahawks (a primary 1 high safety [Earl Thomas, perhaps the best safety in the game], cover 3 defense) have built dominating defenses on such principles (see https://www.totalamericanfootball.com/improving-cornerback-play-with-cover-3-and-cover-4-press-the-rise-of-richard-sherman-darqueze-dennard-the-seattle-seahawks-and-the-michigan-state-spartans/ for an in depth explanation of how such principles aid cornerback play). Michigan State’s defense has – in particular – taken the coaching world by storm. Simply put, the Spartans have laid out a blueprint that allows safeties and linebackers to play the run aggressively (thus effectively creating a 9 man box) while having less fear of being burned in the passing game, because they do not have to cover every pattern by a particular receiver. The Spartans defenders are terrific at reading run or pass and reacting accordingly. Unfortunately for the Beavers, even if they were using such a pattern matching scheme (it is unclear if they were), they were much too quick to jump into man principles on any particular play against Cal. Franklin exploited this over-zealousness on many occasions, both on run/pass neutral downs and on obvious passing downs.

Whether or not the Beavers were playing man or a pattern matching zone on this play, their defenders locked in on receivers in man coverage as soon as those receivers ran their routes. When Cal ran the ball, Oregon State was left with little support.

Oregon State is lined up in a typical 2 safety shell, with safeties on the inside shade of the #2 receivers, OLBs splitting the distance between #2 and the offensive tackle, and the cornerbacks in press coverage. With the outside linebackers so close to the box, Oregon State would appear to have a numbers advantage against the run. Their front seven remains close to the ball (though both OLBs are slightly outside the box), while Cal only has 5 offensive linemen to block the interior, with no lead backs or tight ends to help counterbalance the Oregon State front.

Oregon State is lined up in a 2 safety shell, with safeties on the inside shade of the #2 receivers, outside linebackers splitting the distance between #2 and the offensive tackle, and the cornerbacks in press coverage. With the outside linebackers so close to the box, Oregon State would appear to have a numbers advantage against the run. Their front seven remains close to the ball (though both outside linebackers are slightly outside the box), while Cal only has 5 offensive linemen to block the interior, with no lead backs or tight ends to help counterbalance the Oregon State front.

Cal quarterback Jared Goff turns and immediately hands to running back Daniel Lasco. There is no pass fake from the backfield action (though Goff does fake setting up for a pass after he hands the ball to Lasco).

Cal quarterback Jared Goff turns and immediately hands to running back Daniel Lasco. There is no initial pass fake from the backfield action (though Goff does fake setting up for a pass after he hands the ball to Lasco).

After the ball is handed off, we see that the Beavers have already lost both CBs. Both have their backs turned, defending pass patterns. Even worse, their playside outside linebacker has turned his back to the ball, and is covering a slot receiver on a quick out route. Both safeties are eyeing the slot receivers.

After the ball is handed off, we see that the Beavers have already lost both cornerbacks. Both have their backs turned, defending pass patterns. Even worse, their playside outside linebacker has turned his back to the ball, and is covering a slot receiver on a quick out route. Both safeties are eying the slot receivers.

As Lasco reaches the line of scrimmage, the Beavers have lost their advantage. The playside outside linebacker is almost beyond the hash marks, still chasing the quick out route. The playside safety IS outside the hash marks, most likely looking to help with the vertical route being run by receiver #1 to his side. Both cornerbacks are completely removed from the play, as is the weakside safety, who is also likely to be helping with the vertical route by his #1.

Notice that the Cal offensive line hasn’t manhandled anybody – they simply put bodies on bodies. The Oregon State middle linebacker has filled his gap decently well – but there is no help from the playside outside linebacker or safety to squeeze the play, and Lasco easily scoots outside. No support means that nothing is squeezed to the middle of the field, effectively rendering meaningless any pursuit from the Oregon State front.

Lasco heads towards the secondary. The playside safety has now reacted, but – as with his middle linebacker – he has no help from his opposite safety, allowing Lasco to veer easily away from his pursuit.

As Lasco cruises into the end zone, neither the backside safety nor the backside cornerback has come into view – both have been occupied by the #1 receiver.

Every defense has its weakness. This post is not meant to say that man coverage and man principles cannot produce great defensive football. The aim of the post is to point out a (perhaps) hidden weakness in man coverage that many fans and coaches do not consider.

See the video here:

http://espn.go.com/video/clip?id=espn:11807066

Not as risky as it seemed: the Rams fake punt against the Seahawks

Fake Punt, Play calling, Punt, Rams, Seahawks, Special Teams, Speculative No Responses »

Oct 202014

Innovative clock management and game strategy are becoming the norm throughout all levels of football. From taking timeouts earlier in the 4th quarter in order to preserve more time (common), to never punting and always attempting onside kicks (rare), coaches are increasingly willing to use strategies that would have been frowned upon not long ago.

The St. Louis Rams embodied this new school approach in their upset victory of the defending Super Bowl champion Seattle Seahawks on Sunday.

At first glance, few things in football appear crazier than faking a punt on your own 18 yard line while nursing a two point lead with under three minutes to play. But consider the following:

Russell Wilson and the Seahawks offense had just completed three straight touchdown drives of 80 or more yards. On the day, Wilson became the first quarterback in NFL history to throw for over 300 yards while rushing for over 100 yards in the same game. Simply put, Wilson and the Seahawks were unstoppable down the stretch.

Rams head coach Jeff Fischer and special teams coordinator John Fassel knew it.

Old school thinking would be to punt the ball away anyways, and to put trust in your defense to keep the Seahawks out of field goal range.

The key to the risk assessment is this: There was 2:55 left on the clock. The Rams had two timeouts left. If the pass was not completed and the fake failed, the Seahawks would take over on the 18. They could only get one first down. The Rams could stop the clock three times (two timeouts and the two minute warning). With proper use of timeouts and barring extra first downs through penalties, the Rams would be able to get the ball back with some time left on the clock after the Seahawks scored. In other words, it would be difficult for the Seahawks to kick a winning field goal with no time remaining if the Rams were to fail on the fake punt.

Thus, a failed fake would serve to give the Rams one last chance with the ball. If the Rams had punted the ball, they have given the ball to Wilson with plenty of time and space to move the Seahawks into position to kick a field goal with no time remaining on the clock.

The downside to failure on the fake punt was no more than missing out on the upside of converting it. Failure was, as argued above, in many ways preferable to punting.

The upside to converting the fake was massive. It gave the Rams the opportunity to keep the ball out of Wilson’s hands altogether, and this is exactly how they won the game.

Thus, one can easily see why the balancing of risk versus reward led the Rams to attempt the fake.

Not to mention that the fake itself was built on solid fundamentals, not hit or miss trickery. The Rams motioned their gunner to the inside, in order to clear the flat for the personal protector – running back Benny Cunningham. Punter Johnny Hekker – an athletic 6’5” 227 pound ex star high school quarterback – then took his first step as if punting, before calmly throwing a spiral to a wide open Cunningham. In structure, it was nothing more than a common goal line or short yardage concept in which a motioning receiver clears space for a running back to outrun coverage to the outside, and it worked to perfection.

While the fake punt seemed like an enormous role of the dice, it is more usefully analyzed as an example of new school risk assessment, in which punting the ball away isn’t always the best – or safest – decision.

See the fake punt here:

http://www.nfl.com/videos/nfl-cant-miss-plays/0ap3000000413387/Wk-7-Can-t-Miss-Play-Rams-have-guts-and-glory

Upset Saturday, parity in college football, and the rise of “System” offenses

Air Raid, Chip Kelly, College Football, Flexbone, Gus Malzahn, Offense, Rich Rodriguez, Run and shoot, Split back veer, Split T, Tony Franklin, Veer, Wing T, Wishbone No Responses »

Oct 082014

Not long ago, balanced, professional style offensive systems ruled college football. Just 10 years ago, the final 2004 AP Poll read like a randomly assembled list of traditional college football powers: USC, Oklahoma, Georgia, LSU, Florida State, Miami, Texas, Michigan, Ohio State, and West Virginia. True, Texas ran a version of the spread offense, but to take advantage of one of the great talents in college football history (Vince Young), not because the coaching staff had a history rooted in a non-traditional offense. The only team running a true “system” offense was – not surprisingly – the only non-traditional power of the bunch: Rich Rodriguez’s spread option West Virginia Mountaineers.

Fast forward to October 4th, 2014. For the first time in the history of the AP Poll, five of the top eight teams lose in the same weekend. Oregon, which became a power on the strength of Chip Kelly’s hurry up spread option system, is cut down by the Arizona Wildcats, with – you guessed it – Rich Rodriquez at the helm. Juggernaut Alabama and their pro style offense are chopped down by traditional also-ran Mississippi and their version of the packaged hurry up spread. Mississippi State – another SEC second thought – dominates Texas A&M. UCLA is edged by former mid-major Utah. TCU – who from 1996-2011 bounced between the Western Athletic Conference, Conference USA, and the Mountain West Conference – takes out Oklahoma.

Come Sunday, half of the top 10 was made up of non-traditional powers: Mississippi State, Mississippi, Baylor, TCU, and Arizona.

“System” offenses have a set ideology and method for attacking a defense. It does not mean that they are unbalanced in terms of run/pass ratio (as many people assume), but it does mean that they have a strong identity of plays and formations and a consistent methodology for attacking a defense. The wing t did it with multiple series and an order of playcalling designed to put defenders in conflict. The split t, split back veer, wishbone, and flexbone did it by building around the triple option and taking advantage of defenses designed to stop that play. The run and shoot did it with after the snap option routes designed to defeat any defensive look. The list goes on…

The key to the hurry up spread – the current system du jour – is that any, and almost every, previous system can be adapted to the spread. Many teams couple the spread with the Air Raid, itself a simplified adaptation of the old LaVell Edwards BYU passing offense. Rodriquez, Kelly, and many others base their offense on zone running and option concepts. Auburn’s Gus Malzahn has coupled it with the wing t. Cal’s offensive coordinator Tony Franklin has roots in the Air Raid, but now seeks run/pass balance with a variety of creative runs passes, and packaged concepts.

The beauty of the variety of spread offenses is that most of these offenses do not require a roster loaded with 5 and 4 star recruits in order to succeed. Instead, a good personnel “fits” for the offense are of the utmost importance. An offense can be designed in order to take advantage of lower tier recruits who are hand picked to fill the roles that will make that offense successful. And – because the offenses are adaptable – they can highlight the strengths and hide the weaknesses of a roster that is built with lower tier recruits.

When pro style offenses ruled the day, the traditional powers dominated the recruitment of prototypical players to fit those offenses. With superior talent, the pro style quarterback could hand off to the prototypical running back or throw a play action pass to the future NFL tight end or wide receivers behind an offensive line made up of prototypical maulers.

Rich Rodriguez, with future NFL return man Rasheed Marshall at quarterback, helped changed the status quo. Now, if you couldn’t recruit the towering pocket passer with the rocket arm, you look to recruit the spindly speedster. If you didn’t have any luck finding the 6’3” wide receivers or the pro style tight ends, you put an under recruited, undersized athlete in the slot (Wes Welker at Texas Tech being perhaps the most famous example), and play without a tight end. Can’t find the future NFL road graders in the line? That’s okay – recruit speed and technique, and make it work in your system.

In short, the rise of the “system” offenses in college football has led to more coaches being able to better utilize the talent of more athletes, which has evened the playing field with the traditional elite programs. This evened playing field will continue to lead to more parity, more upsets, and a more exciting product. And it isn’t just the spread offenses that are making waves. Georgia Tech, with their flexbone triple option, which traces roots back to the Don Faurot split t of the early 1940s, lurks undefeated at the bottom of the top 25…

Quarterback Resources: Bill Walsh and Jim Harbaugh

49ers, Jim Harbaugh, Offense, Pass game, Quarterback play No Responses »

Aug 242014

The quarterback position is perhaps the hardest to play – and coach – in all sports. Few players have mastered the position, and even fewer coaches have mastered the art of finding, teaching, and producing quarterbacks who succeed at the NFL level.

Bill Walsh and Jim Harbaugh are two such coaches. Bill Walsh has produced Hall of Fame NFL quarterbacks as a head coach (Joe Montana, Steve Young), but also maximized the potential of several quarterbacks as an assistant coach in the NFL and as a head coach in college (Virgil Carter, Ken Anderson, Guy Benjamin, Steve Dils). Jim Harbaugh has, in his short career, produced NFL quarterbacks at both of his college stops, turning University of San Diego’s lightly recruited Josh Johnson into an NFL quarterback, recruiting to Stanford and producing star NFL quarterback Andrew Luck, resurrecting the career of Alex Smith of the 49ers, and channeling the raw potential of Colin Kaepernick into a rising star.

Both coaches emphasize the importance of fundamentals. Rather than expand into complex drills and arm mechanics, they ask their quarterbacks to master basic drills. Once mastery is achieved, the quarterbacks continue to work on the same fundamentals in order to maintain their skill in a constant search for perfection. This mastery breeds confidence, and confidence is essential for the position.

Jim Harbaugh (quarterback clinic):

Bill Walsh:

Play calling: the if/then methodology

Air Raid, Books, Flexbone, Links, Offense, Play calling, Veer, Wing T 1 Response »

Aug 062014

Play calling is not only one of the most difficult tasks in coaching, but also what coaches are most often criticized for. While it may seem easy to those watching at home, the multiple stresses present when calling a game in the heat of the moment make it easy for a coach to make decisions that he will question in hindsight.

The best way to increase the likelihood of calling a good game is – obviously – to have a plan.

The most publicized methods for play calling come from the college and pro ranks. Television cameras usually show a head coach or offensive coordinator with a large, laminated printout, with hundreds of plays on front and back, highlighted and sorted for every situation that the coach can foresee. There is often a script, which is a set list of plays to start the game. And then there are lists of plays for first and 10, second and 10, third and ten, second and medium, second and short, third and medium, third and short, third and long, goal line, two minute, trick plays, etc etc etc.

This is a sound approach. It allows a coach to quickly access plays that he has pre-selected for certain situations. By pre-selecting the plays, he has already thought through what he thinks will work. He will not be frazzled when he faces a 4th and 15 with the game on the line – he has selected the best plays for that situation when he had a clear head, before the game.

But there are other methods that can be just as – if not more – successful. One such method is “if/then playcalling.” In short, if/then playcalling says: “if the defense does this, then we will do this.” This is a great way for a coach to organize his thoughts, as it gives him a set response to whatever adjustments the defense makes.

This is most effective when running a true “system” offense. One of the best articles on the subject details flexbone master Paul Johnson’s if/then methodology: http://footballislifeblog.blogspot.dk/2011/07/paul-johnsons-if-then-methodology-to.html

When running a “system” such as the flexbone, it is often hard to prepare to face a particular defense, because opponents will often create a special defense specifically to face that system, unrelated to their base defense. Determining your if/then methodology makes sure that you will have an answer for whatever the defense throws at you.

This is also beneficial in playbook creation. If, for example, you are a triple option team, but you have no response for heavy blitzing and stunting in the middle of your line that disrupts your timing and mesh points, the defense will seize on that weakness. By creating an if/then methodology for yourself, you force yourself to think like a defensive coach to come up with every possible scheme to stop your offense. Then you must make sure that you have a response for all scenarios. Doing so – much like studying for an exam by taking practice tests – creates an active learning environment, which will lead to greater understanding and mastery of one’s own offensive system.

The if/then methodology and similar methods of planning work in a variety of offensive systems. The if/then methodology is closely related to the “Wing T order of football,” (The Delaware Wing-T: An Order of Football
) in which a Wing T master knows exactly how to place various defenders in conflict, and how to take advantage of whatever actions the defense takes. Likewise, Mike Leach of Air Raid fame is known for keeping his plays on a small sheet of paper, and using a pen to mark what plays work and what plays don’t work. His goal is to take what the defense gives him – and make note of it – which is another variation of an if/then methodology.

System football – and offensive football in general – is all about taking advantage of the structural weaknesses in a defense. Incorporating an if/then methodology into your play calling will force you to consider how you believe you can best dissect a defense, which is the core of any “system” offense. Even if you find that if/then play calling is not for you during the game, thinking in terms of how to respond (and making sure you have a response) to any defense will help any offense.

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