Keegan Dresow

The Nebraska Counter Sweep

Blocking scheme, Counter Sweep, I Formation, Links, Nebraska, Offense, Run game No Responses »

Jul 042014

The counter sweep is not a common play, but for decades the Nebraska Cornhuskers used it as a primary weapon to power their prolific run game.

The counter sweep is closely related to the counter trey, which became – and remains – a staple in the run game. The blocking schemes look identical at the start of the play, but differ at one key point.

In the counter trey, the pulling guard attempts to kick out the defensive end. The tackle (or sometimes a back) cuts inside of this block to lead the play.

In the counter sweep, the pulling guard “log” blocks the defensive end. This means that – rather than kick the end out – the guard attempts to pin him to the inside. The tackle’s path is deeper in the backfield than on the counter trey, and he goes outside of the guard’s block, looking to lead the play wide and down the field.

The counter trey is a power, off tackle run. The counter action by the backfield seeks to draw the defense in the wrong direction for a split second, which is then exploited by power and numbers at the point of attack.

The counter sweep also attempts to influence the defense to the wrong side of the field, but the play seeks to get the ball carrier as far as possible from the interior of the line.

This resulted in consistent big plays for Nebraska. Of course, Nebraska was also one of the most physical teams in the country, often employing the best offensive lines and the most talented backs. The defense needed to react hard to the play side, and Nebraska exploited that fact by caving in the other side of the line with power, and leading the play with swift, disciplined pulling linemen who were followed by backs who could outrun everyone to the sideline.

While most teams won’t enjoy such advantages, it is surprising that the counter sweep is not employed more often, if nothing more than as a compliment to the counter trey. The two plays go hand in hand. Not surprisingly, Nebraska used a play they called “counter trap” to compliment the counter sweep. Their counter trap featured the guard kicking out the end, and the guard cutting inside of his block – just like the counter trey.

The counter sweep adjustment – at the least – should be installed, to account for a block down step down defensive end. Such an end can be almost impossible to uproot with a kick out block, but is very easy to log block. The tackle and ball carrier should be able to read this block and run to the outside, thus – in effect – executing the famous Nebraska counter sweep.

For video of the Nebraska counter sweep:

For more analysis and video (including the Nebraska counter trap), visit trojanfootballanalysis.com:

http://trojanfootballanalysis.com/?p=55

Lost intricacies of the run game: tackle trap

49ers, Blocking scheme, Jim Harbaugh, Links, Offense, Run game, Trap 3 Responses »

Jun 192014

The trend towards pass first offensive football has generally led to a decrease in run game intricacy. Spread and pass first teams have found that they can put up high point totals with only a few simple run blocking schemes. This approach is sound – with focus on the passing game, the simplified run game means that high levels of execution can be attained on the few blocking schemes that are in the playbook.

This does mean that some concepts of the past have been largely lost. The following play exemplifies the lost art of the complex run game, a tackle trap on a top nose guard (Tony Casillas), intended to make that nose guard’s life difficult while opening a sizeable hole and utilizing angles across the line of scrimmage.

The blocking scheme: Right tackle blocks down on star MLB Brian Bosworth. Right guard pulls and looks for work. Center posts on star nose guard Tony Casillas, then walls off the defensive tackle. Left guard goes for the other MLB. The left tackle pulls and traps Casillas, while the fullback walls the other defensive tackle to the outside.

The blocking scheme: TE walls off the outside. Right tackle blocks down on star MLB Brian Bosworth. Right guard pulls and looks for work downfield. Center posts on star nose guard Tony Casillas, then walls off the defensive tackle. Left guard goes for the other MLB. The left tackle pulls and traps Casillas, while the fullback walls the other defensive tackle to the outside.

The blocks take advantage of angles, including the smashing trap on Casillas.

Casillas is sent to the turf as running back Jacque Robinson (father of NBA star Nate) exploits a wide running lane.

Robinson is untouched into the defensive backfield.

Robinson finally faces impact at the goalline.

Often, the best offensive system is the one that goes against contemporary trends. Increasingly, teams are finding that the spread offense is not a magic bullet. While the many variations of the spread ARE sound football, defenses are now built to stop them, and those offenses lack the novelty that once made them so difficult to defend.

Perhaps those defenses – built to stop the spread passing game and various zone running schemes – are now susceptible to a return to power running. The Stanford Cardinal under Jim Harbaugh and David Shaw, as well as the San Francisco 49ers under Harbaugh, have capitalized by building swift, powerful lines and incorporating complex run schemes and jumbo personnel packages. Once a staple, those schemes are now the novelty while the spread offense thrives. While mastering the execution of a run game complete with powers and counters and traps and whams and isolations can be difficult, it is more than possible with proper commitment.

The play:

Slowing down an aggressive defense with the throwback screen

Blitzing, Blocking scheme, Links, Offense, Pass game, Run and shoot, Screen No Responses »

Jun 082014

It is always important for an offense to put the defense in conflict. The throwback screen (note that this is not the only name for this play, but it is what I will use) is a classic – and underutilized – way to do so, particularly for a team that often uses sprint action with its quarterback.

The 1992 Houston Cougars were one such team. A record breaking run and shoot offense, Houston was known for lighting up the scoreboard with an offense that almost always had the quarterback sprinting to one side or the other. Not surprisingly, this forced Houston’s opponents to flow and devote more defenders to that side. This is where the throwback screen comes into play.

The assignments on the play. The quarterback sprints to the right (as on a typical Houston pass play) while the linemen touch their defensive linemen and go. After making his sprint, the quarterback turns and fires to the wide receiver on the left, who bends inside of the block by the left tackle on the cornerback.

The first step is the sprint itself. The defense must respect this movement and act accordingly to account for the possibility of a quarterback run or receivers flooding in the direction of the sprint.

Texas takes the bait, with the defensive line rushing hard and the linebackers blitzing to pressure the quarterback. Everyone moves in the direction of the quarterback sprint.

We can see Texas doing just that, with linebackers blitzing and the coverage sliding in the direction of the roll.

All 6 Texas box players are now behind the Houston line, while the Houston offensive linemen move down field to make their blocks.

All 6 Texas box players are now behind the Houston line (wasted on the play), while the Houston offensive linemen move downfield to make their blocks.

This leaves the backside vulnerable.

The left tackle gets just enough of the cornerback on a cut block to give the wide receiver a clear lane to the inside.

Next, we see the ball being caught. The left tackle cuts the cornerback, giving the receiver a clear running lane. Four more offensive linemen head downfield to block – on only one defensive back.

More blockers than defenders = something good is going to happen.

From there, there is nothing but open space ahead.

Highway to the end zone.

The true value of the play goes beyond the 6 points that go up on the board. The defense must always be wary of the throwback (coach John Jenkins was known to run it repeatedly in the same game, using it as a staple play). This opens up the field for the basic offense to the sprint side – which is what Houston wanted to be running, anyways. It also slows down the rush, by penalizing a defense who pressures the quarterback with too much abandon. This, in turn, gave the Houston quarterbacks more time to throw.

The throwback screen is difficult to execute and requires extensive practice commitment. The offensive line must be athletic and have great timing, the quarterback must be accurate enough and with a strong enough arm to spin under pressure and hit the receiver in the chest with the ball, the receiver must be fearless enough to take a hit if the defense isn’t fooled and fast enough to exploit them if they are, and the coach must be dedicated enough to install the play with patience. If those elements are present, the throwback screen is a valuable investment for any team who uses sprint action extensively or who faces over-aggressive opponents.

The link to the play (at 9:00) as well as great end zone footage of the Houston run and shoot against Texas:

Below, Tony Franklin and Sonny Dykes show us a modern version of the play with the 2013 California Golden Bears:

Gridiron Cup, 1982: Part II now available on Amazon

Alternate history, Books, Fiction No Responses »

Jun 042014

Check it out…(paperback forthcoming)

Total American Football Links: Veer central

49ers, Blocking scheme, Flexbone, History, Links, Offense, Run game, Split back veer, Split T, Veer, Wishbone No Responses »

May 272014

Perhaps the most explosive running play in the modern era of football is the veer triple option. From the time that Bill Yeoman’s Houston Cougars broke records with the play in the 1960s until the present day – peaking with the 49ers scoring 3 touchdowns in the 2012 NFC championship while using a variation of the scheme – it continues to rack up yards.

But related concepts appeared even before Yeoman’s day. Don Faurot may, in fact, have been the originator of the triple option, using it to power his Split-T Missouri backfield to great success in the 1940s. The video below displays the basic concepts that would power all future veer schemes: not blocking certain defenders in order to gain more blocking downfield and to give the offense a 3 on 2 or 2 on 1 advantage, similar to the fast breaks in basketball that influenced Faurot’s innovation. The footage – slowed due to the cameras of the time – shows the unblocked defenders steaming into the backfield while the dive back rushes ahead or the quarterback pitches behind (and notice the underhanded “pitch”).

Faurot coached the Iowa Pre-Flight Seahawks during the World War II years, where he had an assistant coach named Bud Wilkinson. Wilkinson took the Split-T (and it’s signature option) with him to Oklahoma. There, the offense powered the Sooners to a 47-game winning streak from 1953 to 1957, an NCAA Division I record that still stands today.

The following video shows the 1955 Oklahoma Sooners season highlights:

Bill Yeoman invented the veer offense at Houston in 1964. His offense went on to lead the nation in offense for three straight years, and led the country in scoring in 1968. For anyone looking to implement the veer, the 1968 playbook remains a masterpiece. There is no better source for understanding the offense:

http://www.scribd.com/doc/2939669/1968-Houston-Veer

The veer scheme eventually powered the wishbone offense. The final wishbone powerhouse were the Oklahoma Sooners and Barry Switzer, who used it to win 3 national championships and 12 Big Eight titles. They also set the all time single game rushing record of 768 yards, as seen here:

The flexbone later grew out of the wishbone. The most notable current flexbone coach is Paul Johnson. This blog post details Johnson’s “If then” play calling methodology. This methodology is not only valuable to coaches looking to run veer based option offenses, but to any coaches who are looking for a methodology to systematically call their plays in order to exploit weaknesses in a defense.

http://footballislifeblog.blogspot.dk/2011/07/paul-johnsons-if-then-methodology-to.html

Perhaps the most famous current split back veer team is the De La Salle Spartans, known for their record 151 game winning streak. The highlights below show the birth of that win streak and display the speed and downfield blocking that continue to exemplify the Spartans.

In the following link, the architect of that team – Bob Ladouceur – details the ideals that formed the Spartans juggernaut. The article is not veer specific (though it does discuss the offense in some detail), but is essential team building material.

http://fastandfuriousfootball.com/wp-content/uploads/coachingmaterial2/De%20La%20Salle%20High%20Motivation.pdf

Finally, the most modern variation may only be a distant relative of the split back veer, but still incorporates the dive back, and the unblocked defender as the first man on or outside the tackle. Here, Colin Kaepernick uses the veer scheme several times during his record 181 yard rushing game against the Green Bay Packers.

Differentiating the “read option” from the veer scheme

49ers, Blocking scheme, Chip Kelly, Jim Harbaugh, LeSean McCoy, Offense, Philadelphia Eagles, Veer, Zone read No Responses »

May 172014

“Read option” is one of the most overused terms in football. From commentators to sideline reporters to sportswriters, a myriad of plays are lumped together and mislabeled “read option.”

In reality, every option is a “read” option. The quarterback always reads an unblocked defender or defenders to determine whether to give the ball, keep it, or pitch it.

Still, the “read option” has become synonymous with shotgun, spread option football. The play that epitomized the spread option running game is what most coaches call the “zone read.” The key feature of this play is that the offensive line zone blocks for a run to the right or left, while the quarterback reads a defender to the backside. If that defender over pursues the zone handoff to the running back, the quarterback keeps the ball to the space that he vacated.

5 Eagles offensive linemen for 5 Giants defenders; the 6th defender (in the yellow box) becomes the option key.

In short, in the zone read, the quarterback and running back are going in opposite directions from one another.

The quarterback and running back aim in opposite directions

The zone read – for whatever reason – became known as the “read option.” This was a fine development, until it began to be applied to every option play from the shotgun or pistol formation.

The option key tackles the running back, so the quarterback keeps to the vacated space

The option key tackles the running back; the quarterback has correctly kept the ball.

Easy yards for the quarterback on the zone read (“read option”)

The most glaring example of this phenomenon was during the “read option” explosion in the NFL in 2012, when both the 49ers and Redskins had great success with the “read option” from the Pistol formation. The only problem is that the vast majority of their success was not from the “read option,” but from the veer scheme.

In the veer scheme, the option/dive key is the first man on or outside the offensive tackle

The key difference between the veer and the zone read is that in the veer scheme, the dive back and the quarterback are both attacking the same side of the field. In the traditional veer scheme, the offensive line does not block the first man on or outside the play side tackle. This becomes the option key. The dive back aims – at full speed – between the guard and the tackle. If the option key can’t make the tackle, the quarterback hands off, and the running back runs underneath the option key, following extra blocks on the second level and third level (because the tackle and tight end – if there is one – do not block anyone on the line of scrimmage, which frees them to block downfield). If the option key can tackle the dive back, he can’t tackle the quarterback. The quarterback keeps the ball, and follows the same extra downfield blocking (note that in a true veer triple option – which the 49ers and Redskins rarely ran – the quarterback would have a second option key and the option to pitch to a pitch back depending on that option key’s movements).

The quarterback and running back attack the same side of the field in the veer scheme. Here, the option key is too far up the field, so the ball is given to the dive back

Thus, in the “read option” the quarterback and the running back go in opposite directions, while in the veer scheme they attack the same side of the field and follow the same blocking.

The offensive line walls off the middle of the field, and the dive back follows behind, while the option key cannot recover

The dive back glides along the veer wall to the end zone

Less common in the NFL, but still mislabeled, is the midline option. The play is similar to the veer scheme, except that the option key is the first man on or outside the play side guard, and the dive back’s path is over center or just to the play side (depending on the coach). Again, this varies from the “read option” in that the dive back and the quarterback both run to the same side of the field.

Why stockpiling draft picks builds successful, consistent NFL franchises

49ers, Bill Belichick, Jonathan Ogden, NFL Draft, Ozzie Newsome, Patriots, Ravens, Ray Lewis, Salary cap, Tom Brady No Responses »

May 082014

Stockpiling draft picks in the NFL forms the basis for successful franchises such as the New England Patriots, Baltimore Ravens, and San Francisco 49ers. It is where team building, the salary cap, and probability intersect.

There are downsides to stockpiling picks. The extra draft picks are acquired by trading down in the draft or a previous draft (thus forfeiting a chance at a theoretically better prospect), or by trading a veteran for a draft pick (thus losing a proven entity), or by acquiring compensatory picks (which are given out by the NFL when a team loses a valuable free agent).

Why would some of the best franchises in the NFL consistently trade higher picks for multiple lower picks, trade veteran players, and let solid NFL players walk in free agency?

First of all, these teams have chosen to build through the draft, and not free agency. This has value that cannot be analyzed by thinking in terms of video game football, i.e. acquiring the most talented players possible. Instead, these teams seek to draft players who fit their program personality wise, and who fit their schematics athletically. This allows the teams to mold an “impressionable” rookie into their system, which has a greater chance for success than asking a veteran from another system to do so.

Once the drafted players are on the roster, another evaluation process occurs. These teams will constantly analyze which of their young players, do, in fact, fit the structure of the team both on and off the field. While they can learn about a free agent’s reputation on and off the field, it does not compare with their ability to know and analyze their own players.

This is vital in regards to the salary cap. Generally speaking, a team can extend the contracts of their own players for less money than if those players reached the open market. Signing a contract early is beneficial for a player, because it is a violent sport where injury can ruin a career at any moment, and it is valuable to sacrifice a chance at the free market in order to gain guaranteed money and eliminate the risk of losing everything because of injury. The team wins by keeping costs down; the player wins by getting financial security earlier.

Some of the multitude of draftees that these teams have will not re-sign. But these teams still rely on players being productive on their rookie contracts, because it is a cheap source of labor which keeps costs down so that the desired former draft picks can be extended, and the team can remain under the salary cap.

This is why probability is so important. It is impossible to “get it right” on every draft pick. Having more draft picks increases the probability that a few of the draft picks may end up being “keepers” on the roster.

Some will get cut before training camp. Some will contribute during their rookie season and beyond. A few from each draft class will get contract extensions to stay with the team. THESE players are as sure a bet as there can be in the NFL – the team has had years to scout them as players and as people from within their own locker room.

After years of this steady building and stockpiling of draft picks, the extended players from various draft classes make up the team.

In essence, these teams have the best of both worlds: they have found players who they KNOW fit their system, and they can keep those players on the roster for cheaper than their fair market value would dictate. The increased picks also allow the teams to more freely choose the best player available in the draft – instead of focusing on need – because there are more picks to address needs later in the draft. This gives another advantage in fielding the best players possible to fit their system and resign at value.

Aside from team building, stockpiling draft picks does give a team the opportunity to move up in the draft should they want to. The 2013 49ers are a great example – they identified a player they wanted to get, traded up 13 picks in the first round to get him (which they were able to do because of their excess draft picks), and drafted Eric Reid, an immediate starter at safety who solidified their defensive backfield and went to the Pro Bowl his first season.

Stockpiling also means better picks in later drafts. In 1995, the Cleveland Browns – with both head coach Bill Belichick and executive Ozzie Newsome having influence – traded the #10 pick in the draft to the 49ers, who selected receiver JJ Stokes. In return, the Browns/Ravens received 4 draft picks, including the 49ers’ first round pick in 1996.

In 1996, with their own pick at #4, the Ravens chose the best player available, a left tackle from UCLA. They were criticized, because they already had a solid starting left tackle – Tony Jones (who would go on to a pro bowl and to start for two Denver Bronco Super Bowl champions). The player they selected, however, became arguably the best left tackle of all time – Jonathan Ogden.

But the Ravens were not done. With the 49er’s draft pick – #26 – they again drafted the best player available. This time, they selected Ray Lewis.

Belichick and Newsome had witnessed the virtue of patience in 1995, that led to drafting two hall of fame players in 1996, which set the Ravens franchise on a path to success that has not yet ceased. It is not surprising that the Patriots (under Belichick) and the Ravens (under Newsome) continue to build through the draft.

And in support of the theory of stockpiling draft picks in order to increase probability of success, Belichick’s Patriots would later receive four compensatory selections in the 2000 draft to compensate for the losses of linebacker Todd Collins, punter Tom Tupa, defensive tackle Mark Wheeler and offensive lineman Dave Wohlabaugh in free agency. This gave his team four extra chances at selecting a contributor, even if the chances of a late round draft pick lasting in the NFL are slim. Few people took note of pick 199, their compensatory selection at the bottom of round 6. With that pick, they selected Tom Brady.

The stockpiling draft pick system also perpetuates itself: Because these teams let free agents walk, and do not build extensively through free agency, they often receive compensatory picks which help them to stockpile draft picks.

The process can be slow, but it is the recipe for a healthy, system driven NFL team with a group of players who are more likely to be unified in sharing the vision of the coaching staff. Such cohesiveness is an intangible – and necessary – element of winning football, which is one reason why famous “free agent splash” teams (the recent Washington Redskins being a prime example) so often struggle to find consistent success.

The dangers of an overcomplex defense

49ers, Blitzing, Defense, Defensive philosophy, Saints No Responses »

May 032014

Aggressive defenses with multiple fronts and complex blitz schemes create problems for offenses due to their multiplicity and unpredictability. These defenses are high risk, high reward, and high difficulty. They require skillful play calling, as “choosing wrong” in terms of pressure leaves the defense susceptible to huge plays. Sound, simple defenses – while lacking the same attacking and confusion creating abilities – are not as susceptible to such breakdowns. In other words, aggressive defenses are “boom or bust,” and too much complication can lead to breakdowns at inopportune times.

Such was the case during the 2012 divisional playoff game between the San Francisco 49ers and the New Orleans Saints. With 2:18 left in the game, the 49ers trailed 23-24, facing a 3rd and 7 at the 27 yard line. They came to the line with Frank Gore as the lone back, and immediately shifted to an empty formation, with a tight end and two receivers to the right, and two receivers to the left.

The Saints were an aggressive, blitzing team under coordinator Gregg Williams. This style helped lead them to a Super Bowl title in 2009, a year in which they were second in the league with 35 defensive takeaways. 2009 showed the “boom” of the defense, while the Saints were about to experience the “bust” in San Francisco.

Above, note the Saints alignment. It is clear that they have called a blitz in an obvious passing situation in order to put pressure on Smith. It is no mystery where the blitz is coming from. There are FIVE defenders near the line of scrimmage between right tackle Anthony Davis and Frank Gore in the slot. While it isn’t clear which of the five will rush the passer – such is the benefit of the aggressive defense – almost half of the defense is concentrated near the line of scrimmage in an area covering not more than ten yards. Not surprisingly, this leaves other areas of the field open to exploit.
We also see wide receiver Kyle Williams in motion. Cornerback Patrick Robinson follows him to the inside. Herein lies the most interesting aspect of the play. As the play unfolds, Robinson continues running towards the center of the field – even as the ball is being run in the opposite direction. He will run himself to the opposite hash as Alex Smith runs down the sideline for a touchdown. Nothing better illustrates the problem with an overcomplicated defense. Because it requires players to execute so many different schemes and coverages over the course of the game, they must devote brain power to performing many different assignments throughout the game. This means that they often cannot play without thinking, which causes them to lose sight of what is important – the ball. Such is the case here, as Robinson runs in a direct path away from the ball.

There is no misdirection as the play unfolds, above. Kyle Williams cracks the defensive end – a staple play from Pop Warner on up. Left tackle Joe Staley pulls to lead the play. Notice the five defenders to the right of the formation that we noted before the snap. They are wasted from the snap of the ball, with no chance to make a play. Cornerback Robinson is well on his way to the opposite hash. A simple quarterback sweep, and eight Saints are on the wrong side of the field. Of the remaining three, two are on the hash being cracked to the inside, and the third is Robinson sprinting in the wrong direction. The 49ers have almost half the field at their disposal, with Joe Staley leading the play and no one in sight for him to block.

Above, we see Robinson on the hash, and the remainder of the Saints in pursuit.

Joe Staley’s cut block seals the play.

Defensive coordinators must balance the benefits of aggressiveness and unpredictability with the necessity for execution. Many multiple, attacking defenses have been successful and will continue to find success, but coaches must ensure that the players are not so assignment driven that they lose sight of what is most important: stopping the ball. As the Saints showed against the 49ers, this issue exists even at the highest level of play. While it is easy to blame a player for an assignment mistake, a coach must also look to himself, and ask whether he has added more than his players can handle. Even if a player botches a seemingly “basic” defensive (i.e. a safety not covering his deep half of the field in cover 2), the coordinator must ask if this is a manifestation of the player’s inability to play without thinking as a result of overcomplexity. The danger of overcomplexity isn’t only seen in major plays of the game; often, it is in the moments of tentativeness that add up throughout the course of a game to act as an invisible sabotage to playing aggressive, winning defense.

Cheap, interchangeable quarterbacks in the NFL Part II: the schemes and coaches who can make it work

Air Raid, Chip Kelly, Gus Malzahn, Jim Harbaugh, Offense, Pass game, Philadelphia Eagles, Quarterback play, Salary cap, Speculative 3 Responses »

Apr 292014

In part one, we discussed the advantages of playing with a cheap quarterback, and asked whether an NFL team would ever consider implementing a system designed to minimize reliance on a traditional “pro style” quarterback. This would allow such a team to refuse to pay a quarterback over a certain cap figure, therefore gaining an advantage in their ability to strengthen the remainder of their roster under the salary cap.

Please note that this isn’t to say that paying a franchise NFL quarterback is a bad idea. If the quarterback is a star, it is of course smart to pay that quarterback, and players like Peyton Manning, Tom Brady, Drew Brees, and Aaron Rodgers have proven their ability to put their team on their shoulders as consistent championship contenders. This article is a hypothetical for those teams who never seem to stumble upon the star quarterback, and who therefore remain stagnant in mediocrity year after year.

The rarest commodity in football is the great drop back pocket quarterback. It has proven nearly impossible to predict which quarterbacks will succeed in the NFL, because so many of the skills are intangible and hard to measure against college competition. That is why the list of number one overall picks includes the likes of JaMarcus Russell, David Carr, and Tim Couch. The list of top NFL quarterbacks currently in the league is a mix of number one overall picks like Peyton Manning and Andrew Luck with overlooked prospects like Tom Brady (a “fringe” NFL prospect selected in the 6th round), Aaron Rodgers (too slight and with too much attitude to be taken with the first pick) and Drew Brees (too short to be a first round prospect).

The specific quarterback skills that have proven almost impossible to predict are: the ability to make complex progression reads against complex, fast NFL defenses; the ability to deliver the ball from the pocket against pressure from an NFL pass rush; and the ability to deliver the ball with accuracy and proper timing despite the above mentioned factors. While arm strength and accuracy (now referred to as “arm talent”), leadership, intelligence, and positive demeanor all play a role in predicting the success of a pro style quarterback, none of them have been able to predict whether the player would possess or have the ability to develop the intangible skills that make a successful pro style quarterback. Plenty of smart, hard working, positive leaders with great arms have failed in the NFL because those skills are so rare and hard to develop.

An “interchangeable quarterback offense” would seek to minimize the reliance on such skills, and would emphasize easier to predict qualities, such as arm talent, running ability, leadership and intelligence.

The following offensive systems and coaches are candidates to run such a system. Please note that inclusion on the list does not mean that a quarterback who plays in such an offense is not or cannot become a good pro style quarterback in a traditional offense. It is only to say that the offense does not require a traditional pro style quarterback to be successful.

(1) Chip Kelly. Kelly has already proved this possible in the NFL, shifting between Michael Vick and Nick Foles with great success. His offense spreads the field to create easy pre snap reads for the quarterback and offensive line. The offense is built on the run game, as the spread formation forces the defense to defend the width of the field, making it easier for the offensive line to count and block the box (see here). It can accommodate fast quarterbacks like Vick who can take advantage of over pursuit against the zone run game by keeping the ball (the “read option”), or it can accommodate more stationary quarterbacks like Foles by creating easy reads, quick throws, and taking advantage of packaged plays in order to hold backside defenders. Kelly’s tempo allows the quarterback to get into a rhythm without over thinking the offense, while also limiting the defense’s ability to call complex schemes. Because the offense is built on the run game, a top offensive line and above average running backs are a necessity, while favorable coverages mean that the offense can succeed without premier pass catchers (Kelly’s confidence in the latter is evident in the Eagles’ release of DeSean Jackson). Money can be spent on the offensive line and defense.

(2) Gus Malzahn. Malzahn is perhaps the most intriguing coach on the list. His offense is also a hurry up spread offense, but is schematically dissimilar to Kelly’s attack. Malzahn’s offense is based on the Delaware wing t, one of the most potent running offenses in the history of football. Unlike Kelly’s zone scheme, the wing t takes advantage of angle blocks and a variety of pulls and traps. The offense is built on an order of play calling to systematically attack any defense. The up tempo pace simplifies this process (especially with a master such as Malzahn at the helm), as the defense’s ability to substitute and vary schemes is limited. This order of attack of the traditional wing t is combined with elements of modern spread option and spread passing games to create a potent attack that takes advantage of a great athlete at quarterback. Like Kelly’s offense, the potency of the run game and the spread formations create easy reads and progressions in the pass game, making the offense ideal to plug and play non traditional quarterbacks. This is why Malzahn has thrived with a variety of athletes at quarterback, from prototypically built #1 overall pick Cam Newton, to the smaller, quicker Nick Marshall, who began his career as a cornerback at Georgia, to less physically imposing Paul Smith at Tulsa, who threw for over 5,000 yards in his season with Malzahn, proving the versatility of the system. In fact, Malzahn had a streak of needing to find a new starting quarterback for 8 straight seasons (see here), his system flexible enough to adjust year in and year out. Should he choose to move to the NFL, Malzahn would have his pick of under the radar quarterbacks to run his potent system.

(3) The pistol offense. The pistol offense makes a quarterback’s job easier in several ways. The run game is powerful and downhill. The veer scheme requires a quarterback with top flight speed (such as Robert Griffin III and Colin Kaepernick) because the mesh point happens deeper in the backfield, but with that speed, the defense is forced to decide between playing aggressive against the option elements (potentially leading to over aggressiveness that the veer scheme can exploit, and easy reads for the quarterback in the pass game) or playing a more passive defense that is susceptible to the power elements of the scheme. The pistol also takes the quarterback out from under center, giving him increased vision in the pass game. The offense has already thrived with the Redskins and 49ers, though neither has used it exclusively. While Chris Ault is retired and unlikely to get an NFL look, the offense is popular enough for other coaches to implement the scheme. The most likely scenario is for it to continue to be used within “typical” NFL offenses, as a weapon to take advantage of a quarterback with the speed of Griffin III or Kaepernick.

(4) Jim Harbaugh power offense. Jim Harbaugh makes the list because he is confident enough in his system and his ability as a quarterbacks coach to believe he can make a wide range of quarterbacks successful. He has already proven adept, resurrecting Alex Smith’s career, and turning raw Colin Kaepernick into one of the league’s premier playmakers. His system is built on a powerful and complex run game, unbalanced lines, pre snap shifts, and versatile personnel. Defensive coordinators know that Harbaugh is looking to assert his will with his complex run game. The potent run and play action games in turn create easier reads for the quarterbacks. Unlike the spread and many NFL offenses, Harbaugh often keeps extra blockers in the backfield, giving his quarterback simpler 4 or 3 or even 2 receiver reads.

Harbaugh’s offense is complex, however, requiring quarterbacks to choose between multiple plays at the line of scrimmage on most snaps depending on the defense. But those decisions are a matter of intelligence, not instinct, and intelligence is more easily measured than intangible NFL quarterback skills. This is why Harbaugh has been successful with Alex Smith and Colin Kaepernick, both of whom have size, speed, arm strength and intelligence, but whose NFL drop back quarterback skills were questioned before Harbaugh became their coach.

Harbaugh and the 49ers will soon show their intentions. Should they pay Colin Kaepernick like a top NFL quarterback, they take the course of the typical NFL franchise. Should they attempt to low ball Kaepernick in negotiations, it will be a sign of their confidence in Harbaugh’s quarterback development abilities. Don’t be surprised if the 49ers pick another raw, athletic, developmental quarterback with great arm strength in the upcoming draft, such as Virginia Tech’s Logan Thomas.

(5) The Air Raid crew. The coaching tree that Hal Mumme started (including Mike Leach, Kevin Sumlin, Art Broyles, Dana Holgorsen, and Tony Franklin) continues to tear up the college ranks. Rooted in LaVell Edwards’s BYU passing offense, hallmarks of the Air Raid are simplicity, tempo, and a willingness to throw the ball all of the time (in the original Air Raid offense). These factors – like Kelly’s and Malzahn’s offenses – simplify quarterback reads. Unlike Kelly’s and Malzahns, the Air Raid offense centers on the passing game. The core Air Raid coaches (Mumme, Leach) seek to throw the ball to the extreme, therefore perfecting their limited plays and creating some of the most potent offenses in NFL history. The simple reads, small playbook, and insistence on throwing help a quarterback get into a rhythm, which is one reason why Leach was able to plug in one record setting, below the radar recruit after another at Texas Tech and now Washington State.

The two most likely NFL coaches – Sumlin and Broyles – seek more balance in the offense. Both have produced major NFL prospects in the last several years (Johnny Manziel for Sumlin and Griffin III for Broyles). More importantly, both have been just as successful with quarterbacks who were seen as having little NFL potential. They are masters of the spread passing game, and with so many quarterbacks throwing from the spread in youth football, high school, and college, it only makes sense that an experienced spread coach would ease the transition to the NFL for such quarterbacks.

(6) Run and shoot. The run and shoot makes the list because it has already thrived in the NFL. The offense is designed as “organized playground ball,” allowing receivers to find open space after the snap depending on the defense. While the offense is difficult to master, it has thrived in the NFL and USFL with a variety of quarterbacks. The reads required are different from the complex NFL progressions that make the position so difficult, and as the name implies, the ball is often thrown from outside the pocket. Unfortunately, June Jones is one of the last remaining true run and shoot coaches, and the offense has probably been absorbed into the greater NFL schematics (see here), making it unlikely to return to the NFL in its true form. If it does, expect success with proper modernization to adjust for modern blitz schemes. As long time NFL coach Marty Shottenheimer once said: “I don’t think anybody stops it. They always make their yardage. What you hope to do is keep the scoring down the best you can to give yourself a chance to be successful.”

(7) Split back veer adapted to the pro game. Admittedly, this is getting into science fiction territory. I do not think that this will happen. However, there are reasons to believe it could be successful in the NFL. First of all, the veer scheme has worked in recent years (see: pistol). The NFL is warming to the idea that the option game can succeed. The split back veer is also a “pro” formation – the split backs are in the same alignment as the original Bill Walsh west coast offense and the original Edwards BYU/Air Raid configuration. The offense is designed for a fast, tough, smart, competitive quarterback, which are easier to find than true drop back quarterbacks. The reads in the pass game are simplified by the potency of the run game. Like the wing t, the split back veer has a system for play calling, with answers for every defense imaginable. With multiple options after the snap on every play, in theory the defense is never “right.” This is part of the reason that the offense has driven some of the most successful programs in the country, from De La Salle high school in Concord, CA, to NCAA division II power Carson Newman.

With the professionalism and skill of NFL players, the most often cited drawback of the offense (poor passing game) could be overcome with a reliance on simple, proven concepts, such as those found in the Air Raid or run and shoot systems. Like many offenses on this list, the potency of the run game would create a strong play action passing game with easier quarterback reads.

Of course, the split back veer would require a full commitment that is unlikely to happen. The offensive line would be in unbalanced, forward leaning stances, as would the running backs. The quarterbacks would need to learn how to protect themselves in the run game, or face a severe beating.

It won’t happen, but it would be interesting.

Cheap, interchangeable quarterbacks in the NFL Part I: trend of the future?

Offense, Quarterback play, Salary cap, Speculative 2 Responses »

Apr 232014

In 2013, the consensus top two teams in the NFL (Seahawks, 49ers) were led by young quarterbacks on their rookie contracts. In 2012, the Super Bowl contestants were led by young quarterbacks who hadn’t yet signed monster extensions (Ravens, 49ers).

Contrary to popular wisdom that says the key to winning a Super Bowl is a star veteran quarterback, recent history is filled with examples of young, inexpensive quarterbacks leading their team to victory: Russell Wilson, Joe Flacco, Aaron Rodgers, Ben Roethlisberger (his first championship), Tom Brady (his first championship, though Drew Bledsoe was on the roster), and Kurt Warner.

The key reason for this phenomenon is obvious: the cheaper the quarterback, the more money available to pay the remainder of the roster. A team with a decent, cheap quarterback has the best of both worlds: they have quality at the most important position on the field, but also have more cap freedom than teams with established quarterbacks. The Seahawks and 49ers both exemplified this point. Both quarterbacks were on rookie contracts. The remainder of each roster was loaded with stars. The offensive and defensive lines of both teams were dominant. Each had a star running back. The 49ers had all time great group of linebackers and a solid secondary, while the Seahawks had a solid set of linebackers and an all time great group of defensive backs. Both had expensive, dangerous pass catchers. And the quarterbacks played great – Wilson making the correct decisions and key plays to win a Super Bowl, and Kaepernick at times putting his offense on his back. More relevant to this conversation, the young quarterbacks played in systems that were designed to capitalize on their strengths and which did not rely primarily on them throwing a multitude of traditional drop back pocket passes each game.

The cautionary tale for what can happen after a Super Bowl victory is the Baltimore Ravens of 2013. Fresh off of their championship, Joe Flacco commanded a salary ($120 million) commensurate with other Super Bowl winning quarterbacks. This salary in effect pushed his most dependable target – Anquan Boldin – out the door. This was one key reason why the Ravens finished their Super Bowl defense at 8-8, 3rd in their division, and missed the playoffs.

The Seahawks won the Super Bowl with an all time great defense, a strong running game, and a young quarterback on his rookie contract who made key throws and did not make mistakes. They will soon need to pay that quarterback. It is no coincidence that they let key Super Bowl contributors walk in the offseason, such as Golden Tate, Red Bryant, Chris Clemons, Clinton McDonald, and Breno Giacomini.

Of course, most teams feel “stuck” to pay such a quarterback, at the expense of the rest of their roster.

But what if an NFL team decided against doing so? What if they refused to pay a quarterback more than any other position on the field? Is it possible that a coach and organization would say, for example, that we will never pay a quarterback more than $10 million per year? That we will build a superior team and system, so that we are confident in our ability to win without a traditional “franchise” quarterback? That we can create a system where the quarterback is easily replaced, and that the fortunes of our team will not rest so heavily on one position?

At first glance, this seems unlikely. But the NFL is changing. College systems and coaches were not supposed to succeed in the NFL. Yet in the last two years, the pistol offense (Redskins, 49ers to some extent) and its variation of the veer option (which is often mislabeled as the “read” option, and differs in that the first man on or outside the play side tackle is the option key, as opposed to a backside defender on the read option) has thrived. The 49ers scored 3 touchdowns on the veer scheme in the 2011 NFC Championship against the Falcons, while Robert Griffin III excelled in his rookie season primarily operating out of the pistol. Next, Chip Kelly brought his hurry up spread offense to the NFL. It proved effective with two quarterbacks who contrast one another in almost every way – Michael Vick and Nick Foles – as the Eagles exceeded expectations in making the playoffs.

We know that the rarest commodity in football is the top flight drop back passer. In any given season, there are 10-15 men on the planet who prove capable of successfully operating a traditional NFL passing offense as the focal point of that offense. Installing an offense that can take advantage of a non traditional, interchangeable quarterback would be a huge risk. But perhaps the bigger risk is continuing to hit one’s head against the wall, when decades of evidence show that operating a “pro” style offense requires a commodity that less than half of the teams possess at any given time. And even the teams who do possess a competent quarterback are one injury away from disaster.

In part two, we will look at the systems and coaches who could work with a cheaper, “interchangeable” quarterback system, from Chip Kelly’s zone blocking spread to Gus Malzahn’s wing t spread to Jim Harbaugh’s power scheme to the pistol to a variation of the split back veer to the run and shoot and the Air Raid craze.

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